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This thesis deals with the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) concept
and life cycle costing techniques. It also presents the LCC
application methodology in new weapon systems acquisition
for the Republic of Korea( R. 0. K. ) military.
Historically, the acquisition of a weapon system in the
Republic of Korea has been made on the basis of system
effectiveness and initial acquisition cost, with little or
no consideration being given to Operating and Support( O&S)
costs that will be incurred after the system is deployed in
the field.
_
The Korea has concentrated on self-production
since 1976. Also, Korea still acquires most of its sophis-
ticated weapon systems from foreign countries. Under this
situation, broad understanding of LCC concept and techniques
are needed.
This thesis introduces the LCC concept. Life cycle
costing techniques and the methodology for Life Cycle Cost
analysis. Then, the aircraft cost-estimating models' for
application are reviewed. It proceeds with applying the LCC
for the aircraft acquisition program. By using the cost-
estimating model, two alternative aircraft (F-14, F-18) and
an existing aircraft( F-4) are compared, then the preferred
alternative for the R. O. K. is selected on the basis of LCC
results. It is shown that the F-18 is the preferred alter-
native aircraft among the two alternatives.
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In recent years the military sevices have increasingly
emphasized Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of new weapon systems in an
effort to reduce rising acquisition costs and operating and
support costs (O&S).
Traditionally, military procurements have emphasized
unit cost as the major determining factor in weapon system
acquisition. As the results of emphasis on unit cost, their
0$S costs after the systems are placed into operation are
rapidly increasing. The cost of operating and supporting
over their useful life is generally greater than, and often
several times greater than, the ijiitLlaJ._-ajs.qui,sil:i.QrL_pr-icB-
Therefore, including these future costs as part of the deci-
sion criteria just makes good sense. Reduction in O&S costs
can be brought about primarily through increased considera-
tion of these costs in various design and support decisions.
Since the objective is to reduce LCC, i.e., total cost, equal
emphasis must be given to all costs, research and develop-
ment, production, and O&S cost.
Historically, the acquisition of weapon systems in the
Republic of Korea ( R. 0. K. ) has been made on the basis of
system effectiveness and initial acquisition cost, with
little or no consideration being given to O&S costs that
will be incurred after the systems are deployed in the
\ field.
/ ROK is confronted with the dilemma of budgeting
•^ constraints, a constant and formidable threat from North
Korea, and a desire for sophisticated weaponry. As a devel-
j
oping nation, ROK is faced with difficult decisions trading
\ off military strength and economic growth.
/In every year, about six percent of the GNP which
accounted for one-third of the national budget, was spent on
defense. One- third of the defense expenditure, also, was spent
on equipment maintenance. Korea h^^ concentrated on self-
production as one of Force Improvement Plans (FIP) since
1975. However, the ROK still acquires most of its sophisti-
cated weapon systems from foreign countries. This situation
puts increasing pressure to reduce defense spending and has
encouraged new approaches to managing weapon systems acqui-
sition and O&S costs.
During the acquisition stage, if no consideration is
given to O&S cost, the R. 0. K. will be confronted with unbu-
geted future O&S costs incurred by the new systems. If this
pattern is allowed to continue, the bulk of the annual
defense budget will be allocated to support existing
systems, thereby reducing or perhaps delaying for a long
time, future acquisition programs.
B. OBJECTIVES
/ This research introduces the LCC concept within the
Republic of Korea military and presents the LCC application
methodology through a hypothetical aircraft acquisition
program.
Korea has concentrated on self-production as one of the
Force Improvement Plans (FIP) since 1976. However, Korea
still acquires most of its sophisticated weapon systems from
other countries where such systems already have been devel-
oped, tested, produced and deployed. For this reason, the
methodology developed here is devoted to the life cycle cost
approach in terms of logistic as a criterion for selecting
the preferred alternative when the weapon systems are
acquired from a foreign country.
Korea currently needs a broad -understanding of LCC
concept. Therefore, we have avoided indulgence into
detailed methodology as a acquisition technique and have
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focused on theoretical study and life cycle cost approach as
one method of acquisition techniques.
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II deals with the- weapon systems acquisition
strategy in R. 0. K. It also presents a brief summary about
Korea's weapon systems production and purchase.
Chapter III describes the LCC concept, history, uses of
LCC information and weapon system life cycle stages and
costs.
Chapter IV describes the key factors affecting LCC.
Reliability and maintainabilty as a major factor affecting
LCC are emphasized.
Chapter V provides a basic knowledge of the acquisition
process and the ways life cycle costing may be used
throughout the^ acquisition process of a weapon system.
Chapter VI describes methodology for LCC analysis.
Chapter VII describes techniques and concepts for cost
estimating. This chapter provides the basic knowledge of
three cost estimating techniques: learning curve,
discounting, and inflation.
Chapter VIII reviews the aircraft cost estimating models
that are used in the application for the Korea's aircraft
acquisition program. This Chapter includes the Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation( RDT&E) and Flyaway cost-
estimating model and the Naval Aircraft O&S costs estimating
model.
Chapter IX deals with the application of LCC for the
aircraft acquisition in R. 0. K. Two alternative aircraft
(F-14,F-18) and one existing aircraft ' s( F-4) LCCs are
compared, then the preferred alternative for the R. 0. K. is
selected on the basis of LCC results. Analytical results are
focused on LCC in terms of logistics support.
Finally, Chapter X presents the conclusions and
recommendations.
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ii. weapon systems acquisition strategy im republic of
kore:a ( rToTk. )
Acqusition is defined as the means of acquiring by
contract, with appropriate funds, of supplies (including
construction) by and for the use of the Government through
purchase, lease, or barter, whether the supplies or services
are already in existence or must be created, developed,
demonstrated, and evaluated.
Acqusition begins at the point when agency needs are
established and includes solicitation and selection of
sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract
performance, contract administration, and those technical
and management functions directly related to the process of
fullfilling agency needs by contract. [ Ref . 1: p. 19]
Small countries are not normally capable of satisfying
all their military needs through iniexiiaL- manufac^turing due
to a lack of domestic resources. The required combination
of large amounts of capital-, raw materials, advanced tech-
nology, and skilled manpower needed for the establishment
and operation of defense-oriented industries can rarely be
found in small countries. [Ref. 2: p. 8]








In the concrete, self-production comprises pure R&D and
production, copy production of the existing system, and
modification production. Co-production includes technology
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import, license, royalty, and hardware import type. Direct
purchase can be classified either by purchas_e roirte- -or
condition. Cooperative production involves joint produc-
tion, joint venture, and multi-national industry. Military
aid is divided into grant-aid and foreign military sale
( FMS )
.
In developing countries whose industry and economic
power are behind, self-production may not be the best alter-
native. [ Ref . 3: p. 124]
What is the best strategy? It depends on the situation.
Under the enemy's threat and time constraint for self-
production, direct purchase may the best way. Also,
co-production may be a better strategy because of limited
technology to produce high-level systems. Sometimes, joint
production was undertaken by allied nations to improve
economical benefits and strengthen the allied relationships.
Self-production of a weapons system must be the ultimate
goal for the ROK self defense endeavor. ROK has concentrated
on self-production since 1976, even if it has some dis-advan-
tages such as more R&D and production cost, more time, and
higher failure probability during R&D. But, it has advan-
tages such as techno-economic effects to the other indus-
tries, enhancement of people's morale, and inspiration of
self-defense spirit.
This chapter will briefly review the weapons system
acquisition strategy in the R. 0. K.
A. WEAPON SYSTEM PRODUCTION
The ROK is currently developing an indigenous weapons
production industry as part of the Force Improvement
Program. Professor Young-Sun Ha of the Seoul National
University breaks the development of the ROK defense
industry into four distinct phases. This development is
establishing Korean' s positi on as a major arms producer and
^
—
exporter among developing nations. [Ref. 4: p. 225]
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The first phase ( 1968-1971) began with President Park's
decision to build muniti ons factories^ in response to a North
Korean attack on the presidential mansion. [ Ref . 4: p. 225]
This proved to be only the beginning of the ROK weapons
industry. After President Nixon announced in 1969 his plan
to reduce the number of U. S. troops stationed in Korea,
President Park felt a strong need to develop the range of
the defense industries.
During the second phase (1972-1976), ROK expenditures
for the research and development of weapon systems began a
gradual steady growth. as is depicted in Table I. [Ref. 4:
p. 226] and [ Ref. 9: p. 5]
TABLE I
ROK DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY APPROPRIATIONS CATEGORY
( Current Million Won)
Year Personnel Maintenance ^,^T) Investment Total
1961 12,743 2,948 --_ 896 16,587
1962 16,774 2,867 -- — 831 20,476
1963 16,792 2,762 -•~ 924 20,478
1964 20,795 3, 191 — —
—
940 24,926
1965 24,643 3,923 . — 1,306 29,874
1966 31,953 7,001 — — 1,588 40,542
1967 35,559 10,377 — — 3,569 49,504
1968 44,914 13,302 — — 6,472 64,708
1969 55,780 17,457 — — 11,146 84,383
1970 69,073 22,968 — — — 10,295 102,336
1971 81,825 38,217 341 14,365 134,748
1972 96,987 55,500 2,054 19,097 173,638
1973 108, 131 60,391 2,137 12,971 183,630
1974 144, 107 123,153 8,234 21,348 296,842
1975 208,720 141,169 12,726 79,854 442,439
1976 298,920 170,975 36,035 197,818 703,748
1977 393,301 234,943 36,224 285, 165 949,624
1978 483,557 336,539 30,878 483,379 1,289,353
1979 592,828 451,776 45,389 436,868 1,525,861
1980 792,401 751,607 70,751 642,624 2,257,383
1981 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 2,689,919
1982 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 3, 179,944
1983 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. *3, 189,034
1984 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. *3, 386, 217
* estimated totals
Initially, the Agency of Defense Development( ADD) chose
ten » basic systems for production such as hand grenades.
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mines, and small radio sets [ Ref . 4: p. 225]. The budding
defense industry was aided by the enactment of the
Provisional Law for the Promotion of Military supply which
provided for economic assistance, guaranteed profits, and
the elimination of military service commitments for workers
in these industries. [Ref. 4: p. 227]
This phase also saw the implementation of the Force
Improvement Program, which was intended to create a self-
defense capability through ROK industries within four to
five years' time [Ref. 4: p. 227]. President Park sought to
have critical defense industries operating by 1979 and to
"raise them to a world-class level early in the 1980s with
the exception of highly sophisticated electronic equipment,
high- techno logy fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons,
"
[Ref. 4: p. 227]
In.. 1977 President Carter announced that U. S. troops would
be withdrawn from Korea within five years; this precipi-
tated President Park's decision to increase the development
of its weapon industry and marked the beginning of the third
phase (1977-1981). The ROK, under the direction of the ADD,
began developing and producing highly sophisticated weapon
system like surface-to-surface missiles. It also began
efforts to produce a sophisticated aircraft through a coas -
sembly program of the Northrop F-5E/F fighter, though the
U. S. government rejected a proposal to coassemble the F-15.
[Ref. 4: p. 228]
In this third phase, the defense industries reached a
production level at which many of Korea's weaponry needs
were being met, and new markets were sought to allow produc-
tion lines to continue operating. [Ref. 4: p. 229]
However, as the United States continued to tightly
control the export of military hardware through U. S.
assistance to third countries, the operation rate of the
Korean defense industry rapidly declined in this period.
[Ref. 4: p. 229]
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The fourth phase began in 1982 and is programmed to
continue through 'vi986 under the second Force Improvement
Program which was implemented- despite President Reagan's
decision to keep U.S. forces in Korea [ Ref . 4: p. 229].
This Force Improvement Program is intended to upgrade the
ROK forces through the indigenous industries and U. S.
Foreign Military Sales. President Chun is now seeking the
local development of high technology weapon systems [ Ref. 4:
p. 229] . The first coproduced F-5 was successfully tested
in September 1982 and 20 percent of the aircraft's parts
were ROK manufactured. By the time the F-5 coassembly is
completed in 1986, the ROK' s goal is to be manufacturing 75
percent of the aircraft's parts. [Ref. 4: p. 231]
Despite growing ROK self-sufficiency in arms production,
the U. S. government continues to restrict the sale of Korean
weapons, produced with U. S. technology, to Third World
Nations. The U. S. is, however, seeking policies which will
permit these sales without endangering U. S policy or
degrading the U.S. industrial base [Ref. 4: p. '231]. The
ROK will also shift its focus from weapons that copy the
U. S. systems to the development of weapons that are better
suited for Korean conditions, thus improving combat effec-
tiveness and avoiding potential export controls [ Ref. 4: p.
231] . It is certain that the Korean defense industry will
continue to expand in the coming years and will locally
produce a continually increasing amount of weapons.
B. WEAPON SYSTEMS PURCHASES
The ROK's FMS purchases are directed at fullfilling one
or more of these intended goals: modernization of forces,
self-sufficiency, the growth of advanced technology, and
security. The goal of ROK force modernization has been very
clearly demonstrated by the implementation of the Force
Improvement Program (FIP). The FIP "emphasized increasing
modern fighter aircraft and anti-tank capability ; improving
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the tank force, air defense, and logistics..." [ Ref . 5: p.
214] . Details of the FIP are classified ; however, it is
known that the "ROK's Force Improvement Plans (FIP) have
been used to upgrade the quality and capability of its arma-
ments and to improve the managerial and technical competence
of its military personnel." [Ref. 7: p. 93]
Self-sufficiency in weapons production, as previously
discussed, is a major objective of the FIP. The second FIP
emphasizes
. . , the development of the indigenous arms industry in
order to reduce this outflow of money from the country.
Currently more than 2 percent of the ROK defense budget
is spent in the U.S. I Ref . 8: p. 1 1 1-2]
The ROK is attempting to locally produce all unsophisti-
cated military items.
where the technical expertise is not present or where
production runs of expensive items would be too short tojustify setting up production facilities, coproduction
has been sought. [Ref. 8: p. III-2]
Coproduction efforts help to keep money in the ROK
economy and enhance the Korean's effort to achieve their
goal of self-sufficiency in weapons production.
The goal of obtaining advanced technology is related to
the desire for self-sufficiency. The ROK recognizes that it
will be unable to produce highly sophisticated weapon
systems without an inflow of Western technology. The demand
for sophisticated weaponry is growing, and ROK has joined
those nations who are purchasing the most advanced weapons
available. However, beyond simply purchasing these systems,
and in order to educate the technical and production base,
coproduction has become an important method of transferring
technology and technical capability. The level of technology
transfer "is an absolutely essential, determinant for
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dictating the rate and complexity of Korean technological
advancement in the aircraft industry. " [ Ref . 6: p. 70]
Further, "the more expensive the transfer of advanced tech-
nology the more valuable the spillover effect will be to
R. 0. K. industry." [Ref. 6: p. 171]
Clearly, obtaining advanced technology is crucial to the
ROK if they are to develop the capability for producing
sophisticated weaponry. This capability will allow them to
achieve the goal of self-sufficiency as well as strength-
ening the ROK economy by reducing the monetary outflow from
purchasing weapons abroad and by increasing the monetary
inflow through arms sales to Third World Nations.
Finally, the arms that Korea purchases must fullfill a
defense need. This is the fourth, and perhaps most important
goal; that of national security. Clearly, weapons are
procured in order to deter the threat facing the nation. It
must, therefore, be recognized that insuring the national
security is the primary motivation behind the ROK's
purchases of weapon systems.
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III. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE CYCLE COST
A. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE CYCLE COST
One of the most important weapon system acquisition
concepts to emerge in recent years is that of life cycle
cost (LCC). National leadership and Department of
Defense(DoD) top management have recognized that the cost of
acquiring and supporting weapon systems is far too high. In
previous years, systems were (and still usually are)
procured on the basis of best technical performance and
lowest acquisition cost. The LCC concept, on the other
hand, dictates that the Services define their minimum accep-
table requirements and then procure the system which will
meet those minimum requirements at the lowest cost for the
entire life of the system. [ Ref . 15: p. 1]
Air Force Regulation 800-11 defines a life cycle cost as
follows : "The total cost of an item or system over its full
life. It includes the cost of development, acquisition,
ownership( operation, maintenance, support, etc. ) and, where
applicable, disposal. " Acquisition cost includes the cost
of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E),
production or procurement of the end item; and the initial
investments required to establish a product support capa-
bility (e.g. support equipment, initial spares, technical
data, facilities, training etc). Ownership cost includes the
cost of operation, maintenance, and follow-on logistics
support system.
The terms "ownership cost" and "operating and support
(0<ScS) cost" are synonymous. Thus, the four major cost
categories included in the LCC estimate are research and
development, production, operating and support, and
disposal.
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In the context of this paper, life cycle costs are to be
understood as the total cost to the ROK Government for .the
acquisition and ownership of a particular system. Life
cycle costing , therefore, is the technique by which analyt-
ical study of a system's LCC is accomplished, taking into
consideration the total costs of ownership( all operating and
support costs, as well as the acquisition prices) for the
useful life of the system. Also, it is an acquisition or
procurement technique which considers operating, maintenance
and other costs of ownership as well as acquisition price,
in the award of contracts for hardware and related support.
The objective of using* life cycle costing is to enable
decision makers during the acquisition process to consider
all costs of ownership as well as those development and
acquisition costs which are closest on the fiscal horizon.
By considering all costs throughout the system life cycle,
the" program manager has more visibility into the total
economic advantages and disadvantages of various design and
development options open to him. [ Ref . 15: p. 2]
The use of LCC assumes that the decision concerning the
acquisition of a weapon system is to be made by evaluating
total LCC, and choosing the system from among those
providing a given level of effectiveness and having the
lowest LCC. The validity of this assumtion rests on a pres-
entation of the acceptability of a temporal transfer of the
budget between years, without regard to the probability of
war, or so far in the future, that the decision can focus on
peacetime costs only.
B. AN HISTORICAL PROFILE OF LCC
The concept of life cycle costing has been accepted for
over 20 years as being applicable to the DoD acquisition
process. Its basis is founded in DoD polices, directives,
the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Defense
Acquisition Regulation. The Armed Services Procurement Act
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of 1947 states: "Award shall be made. , . to the responsible
bidder whose bid. ..will be most advantageous to the United
States, price and other factors considered." [ Ref . 39: p.
1]
The supporting report of the Senate Committee on the
Armed Services confirmed that "other factors" included
consideration of "ultimate cost. " Nevertheless, award of
contracts on the basis of acquisition price alone continue
to be the predominant practice by an overwhelming proportion
[Ref. 5: p. 1]. Furthermore, the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) states, "It is the policy of the
Department to procure supplies from responsible sources at
fair and reasonable prices calculated to result in the
lowest ultimate overall cost to the Government. " [ Ref. 40:
p. 1-1]
Defense Procurement Circular #115, dated 24 September
1973, added a section on life cycle costing to the
ASPR( section 1-335).
This section states:-
Since the cost of operating and supporting the system or
equipment for its useful life is substantial and, in many
cases greater than the acquisition cost, it is essential
that such costs be considered in development and acqui-
sition decisions in order that proper consideration can
be given to those systems or equipments that will result
in the lowest life cycle cost to the government.
Although LCC consideration is mandated by this regula-
tion, it should be noted that the LCC technique is seldom
used to its full potential as a program management tool.
During the mid-1950 's the rapidly increasing technical
complexity of defense acqusitions led to steadily rising
unit procurement costs. These increases in costs along with
a general economic inflationary trend resulted in vigorous
efforts to constrain the cost growth then associated with
military systems acquisition.
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The increased emphasis on cost during the 1960's led to
techniques which included cost as a major system evaluation
criterion. Prior to this time, the two criteria predomi-
nantly used for defense systems ' evaluation and selection
were "performance and schedule". These criteria were used
to evaluate a system on its ability to combat a foreseen
threat (performance) and whether it could be developed and
deployed in a time considered reasonable to meet that threat
( schedule)
.
In January 1961, Robert McNamara became Secretary of
Defense. During his. first year in office, he decided to
centralize the authority and planning for the defense estab-
lishment at the level of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and to decentralize operations. He acted in order to
improve the defense planning process by instituting the
following:
• 1. Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
2. Five-year Defense Plan ( FYDP ) and
3. Use of system cost-effectiveness analysis in the
defense decision-making process.
The initial concepts developed during the 1960's to
control military acquisition cost grew from Secretary of
Defense McNamara' s systems analysis efforts. The first
control technique which ensued was that of cost-
effectiveness analysis. This technique was utilized to
systematically quantify both the costs and benefits of deci-
sion alternatives. Studies were termed "cost benefit" if
the identifiable benefits could be measured in dollar
values. Alternatively, those analyses which could not reduce
benefits to quantifiable dollar values become known as
"cost-effectiveness" analysis.
The second technique which evolved from the increased
interest in cost control was life cycle cost analysis. This
concept emerged conceptually during the mid-1960s. The inno-
vative concept of LCC was that ownership cost would be
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considered with acquisition and development cost in the
weapon system selection decision. The identification of the
ownership cost was of particular importance when it was
considered that in many weapon systems the "ownership" costs
over the life cycle far exceeded the initial acquisition
costs of the system itself.
Two other techniques have since evolved. The first.
Design- to-Unit Production Cost emphasizes the importance of
designing systems in a manner which minimizes their unit
production cost. The shortcoming of this technique is that
its focus is on control of acquisition costs, perhaps
without regard to the - future costs of ownership of the
weapons system.
The second technique. Design- to-cost( DTC) was developed
to acknowedge the importance of ownership costs and the
impact that design decisions played on these future costs.
Design to .cost is a concept of management wherein stringent
cost objectives are established during system development.
Management then strives to meet these objectives by prac-
tical trade-offs between development schedule, performance,
operational capability and cost itself. In the design to
cost concept, cost is a design parameter and is continually
addressed. It is considered an inherent part of system
production and development [ Ref . 11: p. 2]
DTC focuses on all acquisition and 0<SS costs of the LCC
equation except R&D. An acquisition DTC goal is expressed in
the form of flyaway ( rollaway, sailaway) costs. DTC O&S
goals may be expressed in dollars or other measurable
factors, (e.g., reliability, maintainability, manpower ) that
are design-controllable and which significantly affect O&S
costs and can be measured during test and evaluation.
[Ref. 22: p. 4-55]
Only LCC analyses provide for estimation and control of
all three phases of a system's cost-development, investment,
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and operations and support. Utilization of LCC techniques
in an acquisition can help avoid suboptimal emphasis on
production costs at the expense of future operating costs.
However, implementation of these techniques has been slow
and the use of LCC as a design parameter has met with
varying degrees of success. [ Ref . 13: p. 4j
C. USES OF LCC INFORMATION
The LCC estimate has many and varied uses. Seldon
[Ref. 14: pp. 11-12] lists six primary uses of LCC :
1. Long range planning
2. Comparision of competing programs
3. Comparision of logistics concepts
4. Decisions about the replacement of aging equipment
5. Control over an ongoing program
6. Selection among competing contractors
In addition. May [Ref. 10: pp. 2-3] lists the following
uses of LCC estimates :
1. Support of budget estimates
2. Design- to-Cost( DTC) program
3. Management reviews
These uses all equate to one common purpose : LCC aids
decision makers by supplying information to assist in the
decision process. Thus, life cycle costing is really a
continuous management process the object of which is to
ensure that new acquisitions meet operational needs at the
lowest life cycle cost. [ Ref. 15: p. 1]
D. WEAPON SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE STAGES AND COSTS
Blanchard [Ref. 18: p. 5] gives the concept of the life
cycle as follows:
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A system, to be useful, must satisfy a need. However,
designing a system to just meet the need is not usually
sufficient. With few exceptions, the system must be able
to continue to meet the need over a specific period of
time in order to justify the investment in time, money,
and effort. Thus one must consider a system in a dynamic
sense.
Specifically, for a weapon system, the life cycle is the
period which begins with threat analysis and the need for
the weapon system, and ends with its disposition.
Figure 3.1 [ Ref . 19: p. 3] graphically portrays the
relationship of LCC to the weapon system life cycle. The
dotted lines approximate the periods during which cost-
influencing decisions are made.
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Figure 3. 1 WEAPON SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE STAGES AND COST.
1. Conceptual-This phase includes investigations into
weapon system design feasibility and planning by service,
government, and contractor personnel. Important outputs
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from conceptual studies are initial estimates of weapon
system acquisition and operational costs.
2. Design Validation-This stage consists of the speci-
fications of the desired performance and physical parameters
of the weapon system, additional research and development
and preliminary cost estimates. The request for
proposal( RFP) is prepared and distributed to potential
candidate contracters. Responses to the RFP are processed
and the individual proposals are evaluated by the procuring
agency. Improvement products from this stage are the proto-
type designs, and fabrication and testing of the basic
design.
3. Development and prototype testing-The basis for
full-scale production are established during this phase. A
specified number of prototypes are constucted, tested and
evaluated. Additional R&D for product improvement takes
place. Pursuant to successful testing, the design for
production go-ahead is given for the prefered prototype
design. The prototype testing can include several competing
designs from two or more contractors.
4. Production and Acquisition-Duing this stage, fabri-
cation and testing of one or more of the production-
configuration systems of the selected design take place. The
contract for a series production of the required quantities
is made. Additional R&D for necessary system and component
improvement is carried out. Estimations for initial spares
requirements are also made.
5. Operational- In this stage the weapon system is
utilized and maintained for its primary mission. Support
equipment and spare parts are also purchased, utilized and
maintained. This stage generally lasts 10 years or more for
major weapon systems.
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6. Disposal or Salvage-This phase entails the removal,
disposal or conversion (through modifications) of the system
to another mission function.
Given the above chronological sequence of phases. We
can associate with one or more stages various military costs
for: research and development, production or procurement,
ownership, and salvage. The summations of these costs are
the life-cycle costs for the weapon system. The following
paragraphs list definitions for each categories. [ Ref . 10:
pp. 2-1,2]
1) Research and D'evelopment are those costs associated
with the research^ hardware and software. More
specifically, it includes the cost for feasibility
studies, simulation or modeling ; engineering design,
development, fabrication, assembly, and test of proto-
type hardware , initial system evaluation , associated
documentation, and test of software.
2) Production are those costs associated with producing
the aircraft, initial support equipment training,
technical and management data. initial spares and
repair parts, plus many other items required to intro-
duce a new system to the field.
3) Operating and Support is the cost of personnel,
material and facilities of both a direct and indirect
nature required to operate, maintain and support the
hardware and software of tne system. •
4) Disposal is the cost associated with demilitarizing or
otherwise disposing of a system at the end of its
useful life, minus any salvage value. This category
is seldom estimated in most analyses. Often this value
is very small in comparison to the other categories.
The aircraft could be placed in storage at the end of
their useful life.
E. RELATIONSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT COST IN SYSTEM LIFE-CYCLE
COST
In practice, life cycle cost estimates can be a powerful
tool for indicating the size and relative amount of
resources required for the development, production and oper-
ational phases of a system. The greatest value from life
cycle costing will result when it is used early in a system
life cycle for the basic program decisions on requirement
and designs. This fact is graphically illustrated in Figure
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Figure 3.2 TYPICAL WEAPON SYSTEM LIFE-CYCLE COST.
As indicated in Figure 3.2, over 70% of the life cycle
costs of a system are determined early in the life cycle and
prior to the time the Secretary of Defense approves the
start of the Demonstration and Validation phase. These deci-
sions would have been made on the basis of conceptual design
studies and the statement of required operational capability
provided by the operating command. Key cost drivers include
performance, operational environment, reliability, logistics
concept, the extent of use of Military Specifications and
Military Standards and the procurement or competitive
approach during the acquisition process.
Roughly 85% of the LCC are frozen before the Full-Scale
Development phase begins, when only a small percentage of
the total system cost has been expended. Also, around 95
percent of the LCC are determined by the end of Full-Scale
development. A little more money spent in the early stages
of the program can save a great deal of money over the life
the system [ Ref . 22: p. 1-8]. Figure 3.2 emphasizes the
importance of fully considering life cycle costs early in
the life cycle.
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IV. THE KEY FACTORS AFFECTING LIFE CYCLE COST
This chapter will identify those factors that affect
LCC. Concentration on these factors early in the system's
acquisition process will either in cost reductions or
provide the rationale for necessary tradeoffs.
A. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
For years the achievement of higher performance, regard-
less of costs, has guided weapon system development.
Failure to consider cost permitted essentially unrestrained
performance specifications which in turn impacted both
acquisition and support costs tremendously. A recent Boeing
aerospace study noted, for example, that an increase in the
design Mach number of a transport aircraft from .5 to . 8
resulted in corresponding increase in maintenance manhours
per flying hour from 12 to 19. Similarily, an increase in
the design Mach number of bomber aircraft from .8 to 2.
generated a maintenance manhour per flying hour increase
from 26 to 55, while a like increase in the design Mach
number for fighter/attack aircraft from 1.9 to 3.5 increased
the required maintenance manhours per flying hour from 20 to
250 [ Ref . 23: p. 5]. The cited examples illustrate the
tremendous impact of an increase in just one performance
requirement on the support cost of a weapon system. Add to
that requirements for increased accuracy, maneuverability,
time to climb, reaction time, etc. and life cycle costs soon
begin to go out of sight. The need to challenge such
requirements at the very outset of system development is
clearly evident. Serious cost tradeoff analyses must be




Because of its impact on both weapon system effective-
ness and life-cycle costing, reliability plays a key role in
trade offs these two parameters. While effectiveness
increases directly with reliability, the life-cycle cost/
reliability relationship is not so simple. Figure 4. 1 illus-
trates the classical relationship between these latter two
variables where reliability in this case is quantified in
terms of Mean Time Betw.een Failure( MTBF) . [ Ref . 24: p. 5]
Figure 4. 1 LCC / RELIABILITY RELATIONSHIP.
As the figure illustrates, increasing MTBF drives down
support costs but is achieved only with increased acquisi-
tion costs. By definition, the life-cycle cost curve is
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the sum of the acquisition and support cost curves.
Examination of this curve reveals that the optimal life-
cycle cost is achieved at the MTBF which corresponds to the
low point on the LCC curve. Decreasing or increasing MTBF
from that point will drive up life-cycle costs. While it
should be pointed out that this "classical" relatonship may
or may not be applicable to individual weapon systems, it
does illustrate a common relationship.
An addtional relationship results from the so-called
"force multiplying effect." [ Ref . 25: p. 11]
For example, if the reliability of a particular weapon
system can be increased by 25% through improved design prac-
tices, this improved reliability produces the same opera-
tional effects as having a 25% increase in the number of
those weapon systems available to accomplish their mission,
and at little if any additional support cost. The alterna-
tive is to buy more systems.
System-wide acquisition costs, then, decrease with the
reduction in the number of required buys.
C. MAINTAINABILITY
Maintainability impacts life-cycle costing in two ways.
First its impact on the availability of a weapon system to
perform the assigned mission has the same force multiplying
effect as reliability. Perhaps its greatest impact,
however, is in the area of manpower costs. The maintain-
ability of a weapon system as determined by its complexity,
access to equipment, trade off between field and depot level
maintenance, etc. determines the number and skill levels of
personnel required to operate and maintain it. These factors
also impact the size and structure of training programs
needed to provide manpower to support the system
Maintainability must be addressed early in the design of
the system. Designs which provide easy equipment access,
abundant diagnostic information, and reduced complexity will
yield substantial support cost dividends.
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D. COMPLEXITY
While the complexity of a system may seem directly tied
to performance requirements, a thoughtful analysis reveals
that the connection is less direct. Simplicity of design
normally produces reduced acquisition and support costs.
In attempting to quantity "complexity" the Boeing study
cited earlier concluded that complexity was a function of
the number of parts in the system. Fewer parts generated
reduced development costs, reduced production costs, and
reduced operating costs [ Ref . 23: p. 4]. Fewer parts
require fewer production steps, tools, spare inventories,
and drawings ; hence, lower costs result.
E
.
STANDARD I ZAT I ON
The idea of standardization is directly related to the
concept of complexity stated above. Standardization within
systems allows for less unique parts and/or less one-of-a-
kind subsystems which in turn precipitate less costs for the
reasons stated above. Standardization of subsystems also
permits the centralization of depot repair facilities with
attendant reductions in support costs.
The development of the F-15 provides a splendid example
of dividends resulting from attention to standardization
principles. Some 254 components on the F-16 are identical to
those on the other aircraft while an additional 78 are modi-
fications of such components. Across the aircraft itself
such features as ambidextrous horizontal tail surfaces and
flaperons, 80% commonality of right and left landing gear
parts, and use of a single electro-hydraulic servo in five
different locations in the flaperon system further illus-
trate the results obtainable from a standardization
conscious design effort. [Ref. 23: p. 16]
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F. TECHNOLOGY
Technology can serve as master or servant in the devel-
opment of a new weapon system. In the latter role, introduc-
tion of technology innovations into the design can reduce
both acqusition and support costs.
Technology can become a harsh master, however, when new
untried technologies are introduced to meet increased
performance requirements, or when the designer falls prey to
the "because we can, we must" syndrome( technological
imperative) [ Ref . 27: p. 4]. In these roles the new
technologies first push up acqusition costs, then return
later with hidden support costs that reveal themselves only
with age and use. Effective defenses against such cost
increasing tendencies include extensive, realistic testing
to provide a broader understanding of the new technology and
the disciplined tailoring of the technology to realistic
requirements.
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V. THE LIFE CYCLE COSTING IN ACQUISITION PROCESS
This chapter provides a basic knowledge of the acquisi-
tion process and the ways life cycle costing may be used
throughout the acquisition process of a weapon system. The
program manager may use life cycle cost concepts throughout
the acquisition process for a major program
The U. S. DoD Directive 5000. 1 defines four distinct
phases of the acquisition process: concept exploration,
demonstration and validation,. full scale development,
production and deployment phase. The four phases are sepa-
rated by decision milestones.
It is not necessary for every system to move through
each phase one by one, nor is it unusual for a system devel-
opment to begin at any of the phases prior to or at the
production and deployment phase. Figure 5. 1 is a summary
overview of the acquisition process. [ Ref . 22: p. 1-18]
A. PROGRAM ORIGINS, MISSION AREA ANALYSIS( MAA)
The starting point for a major system originates in many
sources. The need may arise from a perceived or changed
threat, from obsolescence of existing systems, or from a
technological or cost reduction opportunity. Ideally the
mission need would originate from a situational summary, a
document which discusses weaknesses of an operational plan
as experienced during trial maneuvers or exercises of a
Unified or Specified Command.
B. CONCEPT EXPLORATION PHASE.
The first phase for a major system is the concept explo-
ration phase. It is during this phase that the program
manager is assigned, and several alternative concepts or
methods to accomplish the mission are considered. At the
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Figure 5. 1 SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS.
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reviewing committees/groups to select the alternative or to
request further development in the ensuing phase.
Alternative concepts for achieving the mission need may be
solicited from R&D laboratories^ universities, or industry
[ Ref . 22: p. 1-14]. This phase is extremely critical so far
as determining the system's future cost. As pointed out in
Chapter III/ the activity during this phase determines over
70% of the life cycle costs of a system. Therefore, making
the right decisions during the conceptual exploration phase
is crucial. [Ref. 33i p. 36]
A very small amount of money spent over a short period
of time during this phase has a significant effect on the
system's performance and cost for the rest of its life
cycle. Wrong decisions create problems. Solutions to those
problems later in the program life cycle require much large
expenditures of resources and time.
This phase involves tradeoff studies of competing
concepts capable of satisfying operational needs. Of neces-
sity, these concepts start out on a broad scale and then
become more narrowed and more explicit as the concept explo-
ration phase progresses. Premature introduction of operating
and support details may have a negative effect by closing
out promising alternatives. [Ref. 34; pp. 9-10]
During this phase, life cycle cost models should be
generalized and concentrate on the types of support alterna-
tives and functional environments the actual operational
system will see. They should merely provide an analytical
framework for the conceptual studies and support key
tradeoff decisions. The program model should be structured
so as to identify the relative life cycle cost impacts of
system alternatives. It should identify only those major
characteristics that drive the major system costs. Detailed
cost information, such as provided by accounting models, is
of little utility during this phase. [Ref. 35: p. 10]
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C. DEMONSTRATION A^^D VALIDATION (D&V) PHASE
This is a key phase as it verifies the ability of the
design to meet mission needs. During this phase, the alter-
natives selected from the concept exploration phase are to
be demonstrated, either by analysis or actual prototype
design in order to verify the capability/availability/
credibility of the critical aspects of the system design.
Prior to the next phase, decisions are made to select the
best alternative for further development. [ Ref . 22: p.
1-14]
The D&V phase is* pivotal in the acquisition process.
Dollar expenditures during this phase represent only -about
3% of the system LCC. However, since expenditures in the
succeeding phases are largely determined by the decisions
made in the D&V phase, the cost/risk/performance tradeoffs
made during this phase will have a marked impact on LCC.
[Ref. 22: p. 3-30]"-
Life cycle costing activities during this phase become
more detailed. The Integrated Logistics Support(ILS) plan
forms a convenient reference for operating and support
concepts. Logistics support constitutes a principal design
parameter with the magnitude, scope, and level of this
effort by the contractor consistent with other D&V phase
activities. [ Ref. 14: p. 4]
During this phase, the Sevices must provide the
contractor with proposed maintenance plans, flight profiles,
basing plans, number of aircraft at each base, and logistics
data which can be used for LCC tradeoffs. [Ref. 35: p. 4]
Based on the extent contractors' can identify data needed to
construct a life cycle cost model, the life cycle cost model
begins to take form. Both the program office and contractors
use the model as a management tool.
At this point in the program, life cycle costing should
become at least a subconscious influence if not a conscious
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influence on all program activities. The key challenge to
the use of LCC model during this phase of a program's devel-
opment is to relate specific design tradeoffs to resultant
O&S costs. The data base for LCC model represents best
available planning information provided by Air Force
Logistics Command( AFLC ) from similar systems in the inven-
tory. The model might be used in any of a number of trade-
offs. A typical one might be determining the level of design
in an electronic component which will be removable and
replaceable at base -level. This decision is intimately
related with the optimum repair level analysis, reliability
and maintainability data, environmental data- and logistics
suport data and is all integrated by the life cycle cost
model. [ Ref . 37: p. 6]
As this phase proceeds, the program office and contrac-
tors identify deficiencies in the LCC model in terms of
both how it is constructed and the adequacy of its data.
Thus the LCC model evolves as the system evolves.
D. FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Full-Scale development Is considered to include three
sub-phases for completing the design and verifying its
effectiveness through testing. The sub-phases are detail
engineering, prototyping and a pilot production sub-phase.
This phase is important for several reasons. During this
phase, a production contractor is selected and the second
source, if high-volume production is planned, is selected.
Prior to selecting a second source, the strategy for second
sourcing must be firmly developed as requirements( data, etc.
)
for the second source must be obtained through previous
contracting. In this phase, prior testing culminates with
the signing of approval for full production( AFP ) prior to
proceeding to the next phase. (AFP may soon not be required.
[Ref. 22: p. 3-36]
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At the conclusion of full scale development, the program
should be ready for production of operational hardware. This
requires the full-scale development phase to resolve all
technical as well as cost risks remaining in the program.
Early in this phase, the LCC model will have become suffi-
ciently mature to serve as an aid in selecting contractor
sources.
If life cycle costing is a source selection factor, the
Government should advise the bidders of the basis for the
Government's evaluation. In addition, for both completeness
and fairness, the Government should provide contractors
specific operational scenarios that form the basis for the
cost model. These scenarios should include deployments,
operational concepts, maintenance and resupply planning,
assumptions and constraints, etc. Government reliance on
contractors' life cycle cost estimates should probably
ignore those cost factors provided or imposed by the
Government which are common to all bidders. These may
include Government furnished subsystems, fuel, weapons, etc.
[Ref. 38: p. 1]
A means of motivating the contractor to develop a system
with the lowest reasonable life cycle cost is to include
contractual provisions for award fees based on demonstrated
improvements in failure rates and reliability during proto-
type testing.
Both the Government and the contractors are still
dealing with uncertainty about future O&S costs. Each party
must recognize these uncertainties. The program manager
would continue to use the LCC model during this phase. The
model would be even more detailed than in earlier phases and
include award fee and warranty options. 'Its utility in day-
to-day decision making expands as the program progresses.
Both the Government and the contractor can exercise the
model at the subsystem or major assembly level to determine
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the relative effects of design alternatives on life cycle
costs. But a model is just a model. It only represents the
real world. Because of uncertainty and lack of detail, it is
not the real world. Therefore, the Government needs some
means to verify, before the production phase, those perform-
ance chracteristics of the system that make up the largest
share of the operating and support costs. One method of
determining these characteristics of the system is through
testing pre-production prototypes. A key contribution of
this early testing to improving cost estimates is the indi-
cation of relative sensitivity of life cycle costs to
various cost factors. For instance, the sensitivity of
tradeoffs between the number of spares in the supply pipe-
line and the system or subsystem mean time to repair can be
estimated in terms of life cycle costs. [ Ref . 38: p. 22]
E. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE
This- is the most costly of all the phases. During
production and deployment phase, the system is assembled in
accordance with previously developed documentation and put
into use by the particular Service. For high-volume produc-
tion, second sourcing, in accordance with the previously
designed strategy, is normally used during this phase. For
low volume production, where the systems are highly sophis-
ticated, it may be desirable to second source subsystems or
components. [Ref. 22: p. 1-16]
Those decisions affecting 95% of the life cycle costs
already will have been made [Ref. 33: p. 36]. The basic
objective of life cycle costing may or may not been
achieved; that of reducing the cost of ownership of weapon
systems. Yet even at this point in the life of a program,
the life cycle cost model continues to have utility. The
primary contractual activity during this phase of the
program is the award of a production contract. Life cycle
cost models may play a major role in the procurement
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process. As a hedge against uncertainty, one possibility is
for the Government to include a provision in the production
contract to adjust the award fees based on whether the
contractor exceeds or fails to meet the life cycle cost
criteria which formed a basis for the contract award. The
philosophy behind such a provision is that the contractor
should share in both the cost risks and the rewards associ-
ated with the 0<S<S costs of the equipment they provide.
[Ref. 36: pp. 3-4]
An additional way to reduce risk for the Government in
production contracts ' is to include provisions for various
types of warranties or contractor guarantees for field reli-
ability and performance. The Government would then share any
savings with the contractor or hold him responsible for any
shortfalls in system performance. [Ref. 29: p. 25]
The common purpose of each of these possible contract
provisions is to provide a means to motivate the contractors
to do a good job in the beginning in terms of life cycle
costs and, if they fail, have them share or even fully
absorb the additional costs.
As a result of the testing of initial production arti-
cles, actual cost data can be inserted into the life cycle
cost model and replace the predicted data that had been used
up to that point in time. Of particular importance is the
base level O&S costs which form the foundation for future
use of the LCC model.
An initial use of the LCC model during the deployment
phase will be to verify the adequacy of the maintenance data
collection system used for that particular weapons system.
During this phase, the LCC model is updated and refined to
use as a management tool for key logistic support and modi-
fication decisions. Thus, the LCC cost model appears to have
utility throughout the life cycle of the system. [Ref. 11:
p. 5]
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The potential utility of life cycle costing extends
throughout the concept exploration, demonstration and vali-
dation, full-scale development, production and deployment
phases of the system [ Ref . 11: p. 6]. The life cycle cost
model is constantly refined and updated. Hopefully, it will
have served its primary purpose as a management tool for
reducing the total cost of ownership of a system and
reducing some of the uncertainty inherent in the decision
making process during system acquisition.
r
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VI. METHODOLOGY FOR LIFE .CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
This chapter presents a general methodology that should
be followed in estimating life cycle costs for use in any
cost analysis of weapon system acquisition. The methodology
that the analyst follows draws heavily upon the material
presented in Ref . 13 and Ref. 41.
Figure 6. 1 shows the typical methodology that should be
followed in performing an LCC analysis [Ref. 41: p. 49].
The methodology may be viewed as a flowchart which depicts
the organization required to produce an LCC model. The steps
in the methodology are:
1. State study objectives
2. Define assumptions
3. Select cost elements
4. Develop cost estimating relationships
5. Collect data
6. Estimate element costs
7. Perform sensitivity analysis
8. Perform uncertainty analysis
9. Present results
These nine basic steps are not a serial process, rather
they are interdependent and interactive. Most LCC analyses
will include these general procedures in greater or lesser
detail dependent upon analytical requirements. Each step
will be briefly discussed in the following sections.
The life cycle cost estimates are usually organized in
tabular or graphical from to serve as inputs along with the'
results of system effectiveness analyses to cost-
effectiveness studies. They are also useful as inputs to
reports containing independent cost estimates and to many



















NOTE: It Is Important that these steps be documented
Figure 6. 1 LIFE CYCLE COSTING METHODOLOGY.
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1. state analysis objectives
The first step of the methodology is to identify, formu-
late, or state the analysis or study which originally gener-
ated the need for the cost estimating exercise. Properly
identified objectives will help to define and limit the
scope of the cost analysis effort.
2. Define assumptions
The adoption of valid assumptions that underlie the
estimating process in' life cycle costing is critical if the
exercise is to yield useful results. Assumptions are often
necessary to make the abstract cost model more representa-
tive of the proposed real world, because all specific
detailed inputs are not always available, particularly for
"far-out" systems. The adoption of assumptions allows the
analyst to set parameters around uncertainties and proceed
with the analysis.
It is important that the assumption be formulated by
those personnel closest to and most experienced in the areas
in question-- typically not the analyst himself. As an
example, logistics personnel should formulate the support
concept assumptions and acqusition strategies should come
from the Program Manager.
Typical assumptions for systems/equipments LCC analyses
are as follows.
a. Procurement quantity
b. Rate of production
c. Concept of operation
d. Logistics support concept
e. Life of the equipment/system
f. Residual value
g. Disposal costs
h. Rate of inflation
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i. Rate of discounting
j. Sunk costs
3. Select Cost Elements
The identification of cost elements is an important
step. It involves the listing of all program costs into a
structure which provides assurance that all major costs are
accounted, that costs are not doubled and that the cost
elements are consistently and clearly defined. Cost elements
for sunk cost categories need not be considered.
4. Develop Cost Estimating Relationships
The procedure for estimating each cost element must be
specified in this step. The analyst can select a parametric,
an engineering, analogy or subjective CER for the cost
model. Cost estimating techniques will be briefly discussed
in following chapter. The availability of relevant data at
the point in time when the analysis is conducted will influ-
ence this step. As the acquisition process progresses, the
mixture of cost estimating procedures selected for analysis
will usually shift from the use of CER's to the use of
actual costs.
5. Collect data
One of the greatest problems in estimating life cycle
costs is the collection and validation of data. The data
required for the analysis are often not available, particu-
larly during R&D the phase. Even when data are available,
they may be in a format unsuitable for the analysis at hand.
Data collection represents perhaps 90 percent of the
total work effort in LCC analysis. The DoD Instruction
7041. 3 suggests the folowing data sources: established
reports, opinions and judgement of experts, observation and
tabulation of steps in a work process, outside organiza-
tions, and information centers.
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6. Estimating Element Costs
After the necessary input data have been collected and
validated, estimates of element cost -can be obtained through
the use of relevant CER' s. The analyst should also estimate
the degree of cost uncertainty This could be expressed
statistically through confidence intervals or through pessi-
mistic, most likely, or optimistic estimates.
7. Perform Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis aids the analyst in determining
uncertainty in life cycle cost estimates. The intent is to
(1) determine the sensitivity of certain input parameters to
the analysis results, and (2) to assess the risk and certainty
associated with a given decision; i. e. , the probability of
making a wrong decision. In essence, the analyst needs to
address the "what if" questions in an attempt to minimize
the risks associated with given decisions. [ Ref . 28: p. 96]
Sensitivity analysis is generally performed at two
differant levels of estimation. The first is at the cost
equation or CER level. At this level, sensitivity analysis
attempts to describe the possible effects if a developed CER
fails to "capture" or accurately describe that element of
cost which it is attempting to estimate. The second level of
sensitivity performance is on the aggregate total LCC. Here
sensitivity analysis helps define the cost effects of all
CER's if they interact in a manner which produces an inaccu-
rate over-all estimate of true system cost. This sensitivity
of the total estimate is important since errors in indi-
vidual CER's may be additive in one direction or other inter
relationships may be disguised by offseting errors.
- Sensitivity analysis is frequently used to define likely
costs in the O&S area if performance trde-offs are made.
For example, "what would be the additional O&S costs
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incurred over a system's life if mean time between failure
(MTBF) specifications were lowered by "x" amount for the
equipment?" This technique is a valuable tool which
informs management of the cost associated with various
alternatives and, more importantly, the possible costs asso-
ciated with errors in either cost estimaton or the defined
assumptions. [ Ref . 28: p. 98]
8. Perform Uncertainty Analysis
- In accomplishing a life cycle cost analysis, there are
many areas where risk' and uncertainty can be introduced, and
the more that this occurs the less valid the analysis
becomes. Hence, although the various aspects of risk and
uncertainty can not be eliminated altogether, it is the
intent to minimize such to the greatest extent possible
[Ref. 28: p. 99-100] . Uncertainty analysis is especially
important with. large acquisition cost elements such as unit
production, and to important O&S cost contributors such as
personnel and depot maintenance. In the very early stages of
product development( when uncertainty is greatest) it should
at least be possible to bound a most likely estimate with a
high and low variant. The high and low estimates should
preferably reflect actual cost experience with other systems
or equipment or be based on the outcome of certain events or
policy decisions rather than being arbitrary percentage
adjustments to the original estimates. As the effort
proceeds further into the acquisition phases, more thorough
uncertainty analysis should be possible. Description of
uncertainty as a probability distribution( often subjectively
derived) is widely and effectively used practice. In
summary, a LCC is simply incomplete if no attention is paid
to uncertainty analysis. [Ref. 41: p. 48]
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9. Present the LCC Estimate
A properly completed LCC analysis will identify those
costs associated with the unique situation defined by the
objectives of the study. It is a result highly dependent
upon the specific assumptions associated with those stated
objectives. Therefore, it is imperative that the cost esti-
mates always be closely associated with the study from which
they are drawn.
The actual format of an analysis can take many shapes,
dependent upon its intended recipient, but should as a
minimum, describe individual cost elements and cost catego-
ries by both annual and total costs. [ Ref . 30: p. 5]
In addition the estimates should be presented in an
escalated, deescalated and constant year dollar format.
The overall format of presentation is specified by the over-
lying cost analysis instructions.
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VII. TECHIJIOUES AND CONCEPTS FOR COST ESTIMATING
A. COST ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES
This chapter examines three of the generic techniques
used in cost estimation after the term "cost estimate" is
first defined.
The Defense Systems Management College uses the
following definition. "A cost estimate is an opinion
concerning expected cost. " The estimate is a professional
opinion based upon a specific set of ground rules. The
estimate must be for a cost that will ether be incurred in
the future or for a cost that cannot be reasonably isolated
from historical data, i. e. , the actual costs are not known.
Finally, it is important to note that estimates are expected
to change over time as more knowledge is gained about the
system and how it will be operated and maintained once
delivered to the user. [ Ref . 10: p. 3-1]
The three most often used cost estimating techniques in
DoD are analogy, engineering estimation and parametric esti-
mation. Analogy is, perhaps, the simplest of the three. The
analyst begins by identifying an existing system that is
similar to the system of interest. The cost of the system of
interest is then estimated by taking the cost of the
existing system and adjusting it to account for differences
between the two systems. Although widely used, analogy has
several limitations. Analogy places heavy reliance on the
opinion of experts to determine the similarities and differ-
ences between the two systems. Two experts, given the same
information, often have different opinions. Thus, the anal-
ysis may not reproducable, may not be traceable, and may be
difficult to document. On the positive side, estimates using
analogy are usually fairly easily and quickly done. Analogy
is used mainly in the early stage of weapon syste^ms develop-
ment when the least is known about the final end product.
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The second estimating approach is the "grass roots" or
engineering method, also known as the bottoms-up approach.
The analyst begins at the lowest level( highest level of
detail) and works up adding costs as they occur.
Traditionally, weapon system cost estimates have been
prepared using industrial engineering techniques. These
techniques involved detailed studies of operations and
materials required to produce the new system. The cost esti-
mates frequently require several thousand hours to produce
with voluminous supporting documentation. Changes in design
require extensive changes in these estimates.
In spite of all the time and effort involved in
preparing these estimates, there is considerable uncertainty
remaining. This is evidenced by the large cost overruns
cited by the annual General Accounting Office(GAO) reports
to Congress. Several consequences of these over-runs have
been :
1) A decrease in the public's confidence in the mana-
gerial ability of military leaders.
2) Acquisition of weapon systems that were not cost
effective.
3) Forced reductions in the number of units purchased in
order to stay under an imposed ceiling on the weapon
system s acquisition cost.
4) Financial hardships experienced by military contrac-
tors in trying to meet unrealistic price estimates.
Within the last decade, a third major approach to cost
estimation has come into prominence. Independent parametric
cost estimation has received considerable attention in DoD
as a means of increasing the accuracy of cost estimates.
Parametric estimation is a technique using various mathemat-
ical processes, such as regression analysis, to develop a
Cost Estimating Relationship (CER). A CER is simply a mathe-
matical equation that relates one or more characteristics of
the system to cost. It is a function of one or more indepen-
dent variables which yields cost as a dependent variable
[ Ref . 16: p. 46]. The equation can be simple or complex,
linear or non-linear.
51
Data requirements for parametric estimating are exten-
sive. The cost estimator must recognize which variables have
a valid relationship to cost. Once developed, CER's must be
continually updated and refined as new data are obtained.
The new data add to the data base allowing the CER to become
more useful. It is evident that CER's may be constrained by
the need for a suitable data base of similar systems.
Although parametric analysis may be used through the acqui-
sition cycle, it must be used extensively during the concep-
tual and validation phases.
Parametric costing is thought to be more reliable than
analogous costing. The reason is most likely more a function
of definition and use than fact. [ Ref . 17: p. 15]
Although parametric cost estimation procedures are pref-
erable in most situations, there are circumstances when
analogy or industrial engineering techniques are required
because the data do not provide a systematic historical
basis for estimating cost behavior on a combination.
[Ref. 17: p. 7]
In conclusion, in any situation the estimating procedure
to be used should be determined by the data available, the
purpose of the estimate, and, to an extent, by such other
factors as the time available to make an estimate. The
essential idea to be conveyed in this section is that, when
properly applied, parametric cost estimation procedures are
varied and flexible enough to be useful in most situations
that ROK military analysts are likely to encounter.
Although no specified set of procedures can guarantee accu-
racy, decisions must be made. It is essential that they be
based on the best possible information. The analyst must
seek the approaches that will provide the best possible
answers, given the basic information that is available.
[Ref. 17: p. 9]
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B. GENERAL BASIC CONCEPTS TO ALL COST ESTIMATES
This section discusses discounting, inflation, and the
learning curve within the context of life cycle costing.
1. Discounting
The rationale behind discounting future cash flows is
the realization that the deferral of expenditures allows the
present use of money in alternative investments to yield
some beneficial returns. If the funds must be expended in
the present, their use in alternative investments is lost.
DoD Instruction 7041. 3 prescribes the present DoD policy for
the use of discounting( or present value analyses) for the
economic analysis "of DoD programs. At the present time the
standard discount rate, specified by DoD, is ten percent per
year compounded annually. [ Ref . 13: p. 46]
The discount factor, for year n and discount rate R, is
calculated as follows:
n
Discount factor = 1 / ( 1+R)
The present value of any future cost can be obtained by
multiplying that cost by the applicable discount factor.
2. Inflation
When developing time-phased cost profiles, the aspect of
inflation should be considered for each future year in life
cycle. During the past several decades, inflation has been a
significant factor in the rising costs of systems and equip-
ments and in the reduction of purchasing power of the
dollar. Inflation is a rather broad term covering the
general increases in the unit cost of an item or activity,
and is primarily related to labor and material costs.
[Ref. 28: p. 46]
It is the policy of the DoD that all cost estimates for
weapon systems will reflect the expected ultimate cost to
acquire the system. All cost estimates should reflect the
best estimate of the amounts ultimately to be paid
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specifically incorporating anticipated changes in future
price levels, i. e. , inflation. DoD Instruction 7041.3 gives
the following guidelines for the treatment of inflation:
1) To assure consistency in comparative studies, all
estimates of costs and financial benefits for each
year of the planning period will first be made in
terms of constant dollars; that is, in terms of the
general purchasing power of the dollar at the time of
decision.
2) When inflation is considered important to the conclu-
sion of the study, a second computation will be made
in terms of current( inflated) dollars. Using the
constant dollar estimates as a baseline, inflation
should "then be included, by using the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense price indices for
procurement.
The inflated value of any future expenditure can be
obtained by multiplying that cost by the applicable price
level index. When both discounting and inflation are
performed, DoD Instruction 7041. 3 suggests that the costs be
first inflated, and then discounted. [ Ref . 13: p. 48]
3.. The learning curve
One of the assumptions needed to perform life cycle
costing is production quantity. Sometimes the cost data
collected on unit production costs do not correspond exactly
to the production quantity to be used" for life cycle costing
analysis. The learning curve allows the cost analyst to
convert the collected data to the production cost needed for
the analysis.
The learning curve is based on historical evidence that
as the total quantity of units produced increases, the man
hours or costs to produce that quantity will be reduced by
some constant percentage. [Ref. 13: p. 50]
Some of the factors contributing to this decline are:
a. Repetition causes workers to become more familiar with
the job.
b. Development of more efficient tools and machines
c. Improvement in organization and management.
d. Solution of engineering production problems.
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The general form of the equation for the learing curve is:
Y = AX'^
where,
Y = cost for unit
A = the cost to produce the first unit
X = the cumulative output
B = the slope of the learning curve
a. Cumulative Average Learing Curve
When an increased production quantity results in a
constant percentage decline in the average cost, the cumula-




Yo= cumulative average cost of n items
X = cumulative output
A = cost of the first article
B = slope of the learning curve
When the cumulative average learning curve is log-
linear, the costs of individual units can be found from the
relationship: [Ref. 32: p. 22].
Y:l= A (Xi^-^e - Xi-i '"^'^ )
where,
Yi = cost per unit for the i-th unit
Xi = cumulative unit number
A = cost of the first article
B = slope of the learning curve
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b. Unit Cost Learning Curve
When an increased production quantity results in a
constant percentage decline in the unit cost, the unit cost
learning curve is described by the function: [ Ref . 32: p.
22]
y: = AXl ^
where,
Yv = cost of the i-th unit
XL = cumulative output
A = cost of the first unit
B = slope of the learning curve
When the unit cost learning curve is log- linear, the
cumulative average cost can be found by the relationship:
[Ref. 32: p. 22]
Yrt= (AJCr Xi^ ) / n
where,
Yn= cumulative average cost for n items
A = cost of first unit
X = cumulative output
B = slope of the learning curve.
The production process may follow either a cumulative
average or a unit log- linear curve. The relationship between
the log- linear cumulative average curve and the resulting
unit curve is illustrated by Figure 7.1. The relationship
between the log- linear unit curve and the cumulative average
curve is shown by Figure 7.2. It should be noted that the
slope of the learning curve varies between different prod-
ucts, contractors, and even multiple production lines.
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Figure 7.2 LOG-LINEAR UNIT COST CURVE.
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Q. Learning Curve Slope
The value of the learning curve slope, S, is defined as
the ratio of Y values ( either cumulative average cost or
unit cost) at two X values (cumulative unit numbers) which
differ by a factor of two. The slope may be expressed as:
[Ref. 13: p. 57]
S = YV Y^= A (2X) / A (X)*^
or S = 2*^
For an 80 percent slope, the above equation can be
solved for B to yield a value of -0. 322.
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VIII. THE AIRCRAFT COST ESTIMATION MODEL
The objective of this chapter of the study is to review
the cost estimating models that are used in the analysis for
determining the life cycle costs of Naval Aircraft (F-4J,
F-14A, F-18A).
A. THE RDT&E AND FLYAWAY COST-ESTIMATING MODEL
1. General description
The RDT&E and Flyaway Cost-Estiamting Model is a
statistically derived model produced at the Cost Analysis
Group. This is a parametric model used to estimate RDT&E and
Flyaway costs of U. S. fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft.
The development of these CERs was prompted by the
need to compare the trends of resources devoted to the
acquisition of tactical aircraft by the U. S. and USSR over a
twenty-year period. The nature of the problem required
emphasis on comparability, rather than on accuracy, of the
estimates.
The ground rules and constraints of this model are as
follows:
a) The CERs represent the cost to the U. S. Government of
the initial series of aircraft; usually the A and B
series. Factors were developed to account for the
costs of follow-on series and major modifications, but
they are not subjects of this presentation.
b) Unlike most aircraft CERs that generate estimates by
major subsystem, in the interest of accuracy, these
CERs are based on, and represent, the costs of whole
aircraft.
c) Both the RDT&E and Flyaway cost data bases from which
the CERs were derived comprise mixes of fighter and
attack aircraft. These CERs, then, can be used to
estimate costs of either type.
d) Included in each of the preferred CERs is a time-
sensitive term intended to explicity highlight the
increase in cost from one generation of aircraft to
the next. This is the increment in cost, it is




As shown in Figure 8.1, the RDT&E data base includes
seven Navy and Air Force fighter and attack aircraft with
Initial Operational Capability ( IOC) dates from 1957 to
1982. The Flyaway cost data base includes data on 13
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Figure 8. 1 DATA BASES.
3. The RDT&E Cost-Estimatina Relationships
The RDT&E are those costs associated with the
research, development, test, and evaluation of system hardware
and software. More specifically, it includes the cost for
feasibility studies; simulation or modeling; engineering
design, development, fabrication, assembly and test of
prototype hardware; initial system evaluation; associated
documentation; and test of software.
The Cost-Estimating Relationship for the RDT&E is :
[Ref. 42: p. 10]
RDT&E = ( 1. 7)( lCr« )(W2-''^93 )(R, 1.7005 )(i.0239'^)
(Millions of FY 1981 TOA dollars)
where, W = DCPR weight. LBS.
Ri = MAX. Thrust @ S. L. , LBS. + W
T = IOC Year - 1978 (Base year)
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4. The Flvawav Cost-Estimating Relationships
The Flyaway costs are those costs associated with
producing the aircraft, initial support equipment, training,
technical and management data, initial spares and repair
parts, plus many other items required to introduce a new
system to the field.
The Cost-Estimating Relationship for the Flyaway cost
is : [Ref. 42: p. 12]
CAC.«c= (90.8)(1(J« )(Wl'273 7 )(R 0.6 5 64 ) ( 1 . Q 1 1"^ )
(Millions- of FY 1981 TOA dollars)
where, W = DCPR weight. LBS.
R = MAX. Thrust @ S. L. , LBS. + TOGW, LBS.
T = IOC YEAR - 1978 (Base year)
CACtec= Estimated Cumulative Average Cost at 100th
unit.
B, NAVAL AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST-ESTIMATING
MODEL.
1. General Description
Naval Aircraft Operating and Support Cost-Estimating
Model is a statistically derived model produced at the
Administrative Science Corporation. This is a paramatric
model used to estimate Naval aircraft operating (O&S) costs.
The purpose of this model is to use as a training aid for
0P-96D aircraft cost analysts, as well as a model capable of
generating 0<ScS estimates for Naval aircraft.
2. Cost-Estimating Relationships
This section contains a definition of each cost
element, cost-estimating relationship( CER) . Costs are based
on FY 79 data and therefore are in real FY79 dollars. Each
parametric CER is described by t-statistics ( shown in
parentheses under the appropriate coefficients), adjusted
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TABLE II




3. Other unit Personnel
Unit Level Consumption
4. Petroleum, Oil Lubrications
5. Maintenance Material






11. Other Depot Support
12. Installation of modifications




14. Replacement Support Equipment
15. Modifications Procurement
Installation Support Personnel
16. Base operating Support Personnel
17. Health careSupport Personnel
Indirect Personnel Support
18. Base Operating Support
19. Health care Supporr
20. Permanent Change of Station
21. Temporary Aditional Duty
Depot Non-Maintenance
22. General Depot Support
23. Second Destination Transportation
24. Other Support
Personnel Acqusition and Training
25. Personnel Acqusition
26. Personnel Training
27. Transient/ Holding Account
coefficients of determination ( R^ ), the sample size (N),
the F-statistic (F) , and the standard error of the
estimate( S. E. E. )
.
All CER' s definitions are for the cost of a single
operating aircraft or unit of equipment (UE) operated in a
squadron. To obtain the squadron cost or force cost, the
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analyst simply has to multiply the cost for UE by the number
of operating aircraft. The O&S cost elements are in Table
II. [Ref. 43: pp. 6-7]
X- Aircrew
This is the cost of pay for personnel, both officer
and enlisted, who operate the squadron aircraft. Computing
the number of aircrew members in the squadron is usually
done by using two components. The first component is the
crew size. The second factor is the crew factor which is
simply the number of- crews per aircraft. It can also be
described as the total number of aircraft in the squadron.
Accordingly the total number of aircrew members is obtained
by multiplying the crew size times the crew factor. The
equation for the annual aircrew cost per aircraft is :
A = OA + EA
OA = X CF X OPR
EA = E X CF X EPR
where, A = the cost per aircraft of paying the aircrew
members
OA = the cost per aircraft of paying officer aircrew
members
EA = the cost per aircraft of paying enlisted
aircrew members
= the number of officers per aircrew
CF = the crew factor or the number of aircrews
contained in the squadron divided by the
number of operating aircraft
OPR = the officer pay rate
E = the number of enlisted personnel per aircrew
EPR = the enlisted pay rate
2., Maintenance Personnel
This element consists of all the manpower necessary
to provide the total number of preventive and corrective
maintenance actions on the aircraft and its installed
systems and equipments both at the organization and the
intermediate levels. In terms of squadron organization, it
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consists primarily of personnel in the maintenance depart-
ment and in the aircraft intermediate maintenance department
except for aircrew members.
Currently there is no data source which reports
actual squadron manpower cost on a functional basis or by
department. Approved manning by department is available from
the Squadron Manning Documents( SQMD) The equation for the
annual maintenance personnel is :
MP = (MO X EPR) + (MOO x OPR)
MO = 16. 9620 + 0. 0083 MMHMO - 0. 9356 NA
R2 = 0. 943
N = 8
F = 59. 08
S.E. E. = 1. 30
where, MP = the cost of Maintenance Personnel necessary to
support the aircraft system
MO = the number of maintenance enlisted personnel
necessary to support the aircraft system
EPR = the enlisted pay rate
MOO = the number of maintenance officers
necessary to support the aircraft system
OPR = the officer pay rate
MMHMO = the direct maintenance manhours per month,
as defined by the 3M systems, necessary to
support in 15 the weapon system
NA = the number of operating aircraft in the squadron
2.. Other unit personnel
This is the cost of all other personnel in the
squadron i. e. , non-aircrew and non-maintenance. It consists
primarily of non-aircrew in the Executive, Administration,
and Operations Departments and the Integrated Services
Branch. Approved manning by department is available from the
squadron Manning Documents( SQMD' s ) . The equation for the
annual other unit personnel cost is :
OUP = (00 X OPR) + (OUE X EPR)
OUE = (2.7482 OSM'''5''8 3 / j^p^
OSM =((0+E)xCF+MO+ MOO) x NA
R2 = 0. 734 •
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N = 7
F = 21. 49
S. E. E. = 0. 086
where, OUP = the cost of other unit personnel
00 = the number of other unit officers necessary to
support the aircraft
OPR = the officer pay rate
OUE = the number of other unit enlisted personnel
necessary to support the aircraft
EPR = the enlisted pay rate
OSM = the total number of other squadron manpower
which is- to be supported by the other unit
enlisted personnel
NA = the number of operating aircraft in the squadron
= the number officers per aircrew
E = the number of enlisted personnel per aircrew
( from Element 1 )
CF = the aircrew factor, or the number of aircrews
contained in the squadron divided by the number
of operating aircraft ( from Element 1 )
MO = the number of maintenance and operating
enlisted personnel necessary to the support the
aircraft system (from Element 2)
-MOO = the number of maintenance officers necessary to
support the aircraft system ( from Element 2)
4. Aviation .
•
Petroleum . Oil and Lubricants
Aviation POL is the cost of petroleum, oil and
lubricants (including fuel additives) consumed by squadron
aircraft in flight operations and maintenance. The equation
for the annual POL cost per aircraft :
POL = ( PG X POLE X FHY ) / 1,000
POLE = 1.0253 lyiS'''^^^" GTOW'^^^sp^ 0.4973
R2 = 0. 855
N = 21
F = 41. 32
S. E. E. = 0. 23
where, POL = the annual cost of aviation petroleum, oil and
lubricants
PG = the price per gallon for aviation POL
POLE = the number of gallons per hour consumed by the
aircraft
65
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
MS = the maximum speed for level flight at altitude
( knots
)
GTOW = the gross take-off weight of the aircraft
(thousands of pounds)
PD = a propellar dummy such that
In PD = 1 if the aircraft is propellar driven
In PD = 0, otherwise
^. Maintenance material
This is the cost of all consumable maintenance
supplies whether acquired by the department stock fund or
any other method of fiinded purchase. The costs are incurred
at both the organizational and the intermediate levels The
equation for the annual maintenance material cost per
aircraft is :
MMC = ( MM X FHY ) / 1,000
MM = 2.6108 MMHFH°-8 5 76 ^ MS^-^^^^
R2 = 0. 829
N = 19
F = 44.20
S. E. E. = 0. 17
where, MMC = the annual cost of maintenance material
MM = the cost per flying hour of maintenance
marterial
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
MS = the maximum speed for level flight at altitude
( knots)
MMHFH = the number of direct maintenance manhours
per flying hour as defined by the 3M system
6. Personnel Support Supplies
This is the cost of all non-maintenance items used
by the squadron for aircraft operations. It relates prima-
rily to the health, safety and welfare of the aircrew. The
equation for the annual personnel support supply costs is :
PSS = (PS X FHY) / 1,000
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 (0 + E) + 32.0680 RD





S. E. E. = 2. 54
where, PSS = the annual cost of personnel support supplies
PS = the cost per flying hour of personnel support
supplies
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
= the number of officers per crew
E = the number of enlisted personnel per aircrew
RD = a reconnaissance dummy such that RD = 1 if
the aircraft is a reconnaissance aircraft,
RD = , otherwise
2- Training Ordnance
This is the cost of all conventional expendables
used in non-combat flight operations of squadron aircraft
for the purpose of keeping aircrews proficient in weapons
delivery techniques. It includes the cost of sonobuoys,
pyrotechnic, ballistic and guided weapons as well as all
conventional ordnance.
No cost-estimating relationship is given since
training ordnance costs are not related to the physical
characteristics or reliability and maintainability parame-
ters which have been used throughout the model. The analyst
can refer to the Table III which provides estimated costs of
training ordnance requirements per crew for most carrier
aircraft. [ Ref . 43: p. 28]
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TABLE III







Airframe rework costs are the cost, including labor,
material and overhead, of making periodic inspections,
repairs and overhaul of the airframe to insure its material
condition. Because of the long lead times involved between
rework for specific aircraft and because of the variability
of the data the equation used in this model is now based on
a three year average of aircraft rework data.
AR = ( UAR X 12 ) / I
UAR = 0.811 MMHFH''-s^34 ^ y^^ti.zs'ie ^ gy,o.4 6io
R2 = 0. 732
N = 19
F = 17. 39
S. E. E. = 0. 28
where, AR = the annualized cost of an airframe rework
UAR = the airframe rework interval in months
I = the airframe rework interval in months
MMHFH = the number of direct maintenance manhours per
flying hour as defined by the 3M system
MS = the maximum speed for level flight at altitude
( knots )
EW = the empty weight of the aircraft
( in thousands of pounds )
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9. Engine Rework
This is the cost of repairing and overhauling
aircraft engines at the air rework facilities or similar
facilities of other services or contractors. The equations
given below represent two different approaches to estimating
engine costs. The first approach is based simply on esti-
mating the engine maintenance cost per engine hour, while
the second one is broken down into the primary components
that will exist when the new maintenance philosophy is fully
implemented, i. e. , the depot arrival rate of the engines and
the cost to repair those engines. The equations were
obtained to estimate both of these parameters.
ERT = ( ERH X EN X FHY ) / 1,000
ERH = 1.2791 THi''»5 77 ^ pj^o.soza ^ MED "-36 4 9
R2 = 0. 96
N = 9 •:,
F = 121. 98
S. E. E. = 0. 09
where, ERT = the total cost of engine rework
ERH = the cost per hour per for depot maintenance
EN = the number of engines mounted on the aircraft
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
TH = the engine thrust in thousands of pounds
FD = a dummy variable such that
In FD =1 if the engine is a turbo fan engine
In FD = 0, otherwise
MED = a dummy variable such that ;
In MED =1 if these is more than one engine
mounted on the aircraft. In MED = 0, otherwise.
Alternative equation is ;
ERT = ( ERM/DAR ) x EN x FHY
ERM = 4.2585 FD'^^^ss ^ tH"-'''*^''
R2 = 0. 89
N = 10
F = 37. 14
S. E. E. = 0. 16
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DAR = 5837.9209 TH-''^^824 ^ yi^^a.ziBZ
R2 = 0. 72
N = 14
F = 22. 50
S. E. E. = 0. 29
where, ERT = the total cost of engine rework
ERM = the unit cost of repairing an engine at the
• depot
DAR =the depot arrival rate in operating hours, i.e.
,
the total hours accumulated by the engines
divided b.y the number of engines requiring depot
repair
EN = the number of engines mounted on the aircraft
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
TH = the engine thrust in thousands of pounds
FD = a dummy variable such that
In FD = 1 if the engine is turbofan engine
In FD = 0, otherwise
10 . Component Rework
This is the cost of reworking or repairing compo-
nents of the aircraft and its associated support equipment.
This maintenance, which generally involves greater technical
capability and more extensive facilities than are available
at base level, is usually performed at the air rework facil-
ities but can also be done by other service or by a
contractor. The formula for the annual component rework
cost is :
CR = ( CRF X FHY ) / 1,000
CRF = 3.4909 MMHFH"-'' 3'» 7 2^-5 8 17
R2 = 0. 88
N = 9
F = 49. 90
S. E. E. = 0. 16
where, CR = the annual cost of component rework
CRF = the cost per flying hour of component rework
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
MMHFH = the number of direct maintenance manhours per
flying hours as defined by the 3M system
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EW = the empty weight of the aircraft
( thousands or pounds )
IX . Other depot Support
Other depot support is the cost of personnel,
material and contractual support incurred at the centralized
depot facilities in order to support fleet aircraft.
Sub-programs include preservation, salvage, fleet training,
customer services, and other support manufacturing.
The equation for the -annual other depot support cost is :
ODSC = ( ODS X FHY ) / 1,000
ODS = -2.4770 + 0.0452 MS + 0.0341 AEC
R2 = 0. 83
N = 15
F = 34. 40
S. E. E. = 10. 26
where, ODSC = the annual cost for other depot support
ODS = the cost per flying hour for other depot
support
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
MS = the maximum speed for level flight at altitude
( knots )
AEC = the cost per flying hour of the total of the
remaining depot support costs consisting
of component rework and airframe rework
AEC = (CR + ERT + AR) / FHY
12. Installation of Modifications
This is the cost of installing modification material
to aircraft ground support equipment, and training equipment
to enable that equipment to perform mission essential
tasks( not new capability), and to improve safety, reli-
ability or reduce maintenance costs.
There are a number of factors that make this element
particularly difficult to handle for the cost analyst. The
first factor which complicated the estimation of modification
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installation costs is that they are by nature not
dependent upon parameters which are predictable or easily
treatable on an analytical basis. The second factor is
simply that there is a lag involved in the time that modifi-
cations are procured and the time in which they are
installed. This is a result of the lead time of the procure-
ment, funding problems and scheduling of the installation.
Despite several problems previously mentioned, it
does appear that installation costs comprise a rather
steady, ten percent of procurement costs in total.
Therefore, perhaps • the best way to estimate modification
installation costs would be as the percent of modification
procurement costs.
MI = 0. 1 MP
where, MI = the cost of installation of safety/reliability
modifications
MP = the cost of the procurement of safety
/reliability modifications
11. Replenishment Spares
This is the of procuring aircraft assemblies, spare
and repair parts which are nomally repaired and returned to
stock. It arises because of the demand for repairable items
generated by attrition and various stock initiatives. This
cost does not include the cost of Follow-on Out-fitting
which in previous years was funded by Initial Spares
procurement, but is now included with Replenishment spares
The formula for the annual replenishment spares cost is :
RS = ( RSF X FHY ) / 1,000
RSF = 0.4876 UMMHFH^-^'^i ^ MS^-^si?
R2 = 0. 71
N = 16
F =-25. 98
S. E. E. = 0. 33
where, RS = the annual cost of procuring APN 6 replenishment
spares( replenishment only) to support
the aircraft system
RSF = the cost per flying hour of production APN 6
replenishment spares( replenishment only)
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to support the aircraft system
FHY = the flying hours per year
UMMHFH = the number of unscheduled direct maintenance
manhours oer flying hours as defined
by the 3M' system
MS = the maximum speed for level flight at altitude
given in knots
14. Replacement around support equipment
This is the cost of replacement of ground servicing
equipment, maintenance and repair shop equipment, instrument
and laboratory test equipment, and other miscellaneous
items, such as ground generators, jet engine test stands,
test sets for radios, radars, and fire control systems, hand
tools, compressors and guages. These equipment demands are
generated by the need to replace common and peculiar support
equipment that is worn out or destroyed. This cost has been
related to the flyaway cost of the aircraft.
RGSE = 0. 0025 FC
where, RGSE=the annual cost of replacement ground support
equipment
FC = the cumulative average flyaway cost of the first
one-hundred production aircraft.
15 . Modification Procurement
This is the cost of procuring modification material
for aircraft ground support equipment, and training equip-
ment to enable that equipment to perform mission essential
tasks( not new capability), and to improve safety, reli-
ability and/or reduce maintenance costs.
There are a number of factors that make this element
particularly difficult to handle for the cost analyst. The
first factor is that the Cost Analysis Improvement
Group(CAIG) makes the distinction between modifications
which are safty and/or reliability oriented and modifica-
tions which are performance and/or effectiveness oriented.
The Navy does not make this distinction in any of the budg-
eting, planing, or management of its modification programs.
Therefore, there is no supporting data which routinely
provides the break into these two categories.
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The VAMOSC Total Support System presumes to show
only safety/reliability modification procurement costs, but
that information is based on the subjective judgement of an
analyst who manually goes through the detailed information
of all modification costs.
The second factor which complicates the estimation
of Modification Procurement costs is that they are, by
nature, not dependent upon parameters which are predictable
or easily treatable on an analytical basis.
Modification Procurement can be estimated by analogy
using VAMOSC data or, the analyst can use the following CER
which relates modification costs to the flyaway cost of the
aircraft.
MP = 0. 0041 FC
where, MP = the cost(FY79^k) of installing
safety/reliability modifications
FC = the cumulative average flyaway cost the first
one-hundred production aircrait( FY79$k)
16 . Base Operating Support Personnel
This is the cost of the personnel providing base
services, such as supply, maintenance, security, maintenance
of real property and other similar functions.
Included in this element are those personnel who are
assigned to the base( not the squadron) and work in the
laundry, mess, supply room, and other areas. It also
includes the base personnel who are permanently assigned to
the AIMD of the air station.
Since it is often difficult to determine the impacts
on base operating support cost of the addition or deletion
of force unit such as an aircraft or squadron, the method-
ology used in the Navy Resource Model(NARM) program factors
manual was adapted to provide an estimate for the base oper-
ating support personnel cost as well as several other
elements which are similar in nature.
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The computation for base operating support personnel
using NARM factors is as follows:
BO = 0. 0014 X TDP
BE = 0. 0169 X TDP
BOP = ( BO X OPR ) + ( BE X EPR )
where, BO = the number of base operating officers necessary
to provide support to the aircraft system.
TDP = the number of total direct personnel
(officers and enlisted) involved in the
operating and supporting of the aircraft
system. This is the sum of personnel identified
in element 1-Aircrew; Element 2-iyiaintenance
personnel; and Element 3-Other unit personnel
BE = the number of base operating enlisted personnel
required to support the aircraft system
BOP = the total cost of base operating support
personnel
OPR = the officers pay rate( FY79$k=24. 86)
EPR = the enlisted pay rate( FY79$k=10. 68)
17 . Health Care Support Personnel
Health Care Support Personnel is the cost of medical
personnel needed to provide medical support to the aircraft
unit personnel as well as the required base support
personnel( identified in Element 16-Base Operating Suppoort
Personnel
)
HO = 0. 0038 DBT
HE = 0. 0059 DBT
HCP = (HO X OPR) + (HE X EPR)
where, H = the number of health care officers necessary to
support the weapon system
DBT = the total number of personnel, direct
(Element 1,2 and 3) plus base operating suppo(Element lo), required to operate and provide
base support to the aircraft system
HE = the number of health care enlisted personnel
HCP = the total cost of health care support personnel
(FY79$k)
OPR = the officer pay rate( FY79$k = 24.86)
EPR = the enlisted pay rate( FY79$k=10. 68)
18 . Base Operating Support
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This is the cost of O&MN funds necessary to provide
the base services associated with the base operating support
activities defined in Element 16-Base Operating Suport
Personnel.
BOS = 0. 4568 TDP
where, BOS = the O&MN funds necessary to provide base
operating support to the aircraft
system( FY79$k)
TDP = the number of total direct personnel officers
and enlisted involved in the operating and
supporting of the aircraft system.
This is the sum of personnel identified in Element
1-Aircrew; Element 2-maintenance personnel; Element 3-Other
unit personnel
19 . Health Care Support
This is the cost of medical material needed to
provide medical support to aircraft unit personnel and to
base personnel who provide the direct support to the
aircraft. This cost is associated with the health care
support personnel in Element 17
HOM = 0. 1148 DBT
where, HOM = health care O&MN funds( FY79$k)
DBT = the total of personnel, direct
( Element 1, 2 and 3)
plus base operating( Eliment 16) support,
required to operate and provide base support
to the aircraft system.
20 . Permanent Chance of Station (PCS)
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) consists of costs
of incident to the permanent change of station of squadron
and base operating personnel, either individually or as an
organized unit.
PCS rates are figured in the Navy Resource Model
Program Factors Mannual by dividing the total PCS cost by
the total number of personnel This produces an annual PCS
cost per person( officer, enlisted) which can be applied to
the number of people necessary to operate and support an
aircraft.
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The Cost-Estimating Relationship of the PCS is as
follows :
PCS = 1.3680 DBO + 0.4736 DBE
where, PCS = the annual cost(MPN funds, FY79$k) of permanent
change of station for weapon system direct and
base operating personnel
DBO = the total number of officer personnel ^ direct
( Eliments 1.2 and 3) plus base operating(Element 16), required to operate and provide
base support to the aircraft system.
Ubh- = tne total numper or eniistea personnel, direct
(Elementl.2 and 3) plus operating (Element 16),
required to operate and provide base support to
the aircarft system.
21 . Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)
Air -Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) is the cost of
travel lodging and incidental expenses incurred so that
squadron personnel can receive training( usually maintenance
related)
.
This cost which is usually small, is dependent on
the size of the squadron, especially the maintenance depart-
ment, and the complexity of the aircraft. The NARM has
representative costs for TAD, but they are not particulary
accurate. The VAMOSC-TSS is currently the best historical
source for these costs. VAMOSC gets these data annually from
the Navy Cost Information System ( NCIS ).
Table IV provides a representative sample of air TAD
costs for FY78 and FY79 [ Ref . 43: p. 62]. Estimates can be
obtained by analogy by using data for current aircraft or by
scaling.
22 . General Depot Supply
This is the cost of manpower and material needed to
perform the depot supply operations required for the support
of the aircraft. When a new aircraft is introduced into the
fleet, spare parts are procured to sustain operations. These
parts are introduced into the supply system and resources
are extended to manage, store, distribute, and package and
crate the spares inventory and other common supply items
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TABLE IV
REPRESENTATIVE AIR TAD COSTS FOR FY79
( then year $ in thous.
)
AIRCRAFT
TAD costs per A/c
78 79
F-4J 2.3 0.9
F-4N 1. 6 0. 1
F-14A 1. 1 0. 3
F-5E 0. 7 0. 1
F-7E 1. 5 0. 4




which support aircraft. This cost is computed from the Navy
Resources Model Program Factors Mannual by taking the cost
contained in program element 7111N-Supply Depot Operations
of the budget and allocating to force units on the basis of
the direct requirements of manpower and operating funds,
i.e., MPN, O&MN and APN.
The equation for estimating the cost of Depot Supply
Operations is :
SDO = 0.0497 (ACR + ACO + RS
)
where, SDO = the annual cost of depot supply operations
required to support a weapon system( FY79$k)
ACR = the annual cost of aircraft reworks defined to
be the sum of the annual cost of airframe
rework (Element 8), Engine rework( Element 9),.
and Component rework( Element 10)(FY79$k)
ACO = the annual cost of aircraft operations, defined
to be sum of the annual cost of POL( Element 4}
,
Maintenance Material( Element 5 ) , and Personnel
Support ^upplies( Element 6)(FY79$k)
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RS = the annual cost of producing APN 6 replenishment
spares( replenishment only) to support the
aircraft system( FY79$k)
23 . Second Destination Transportation
This is the cost of shipping material needed to
support the aircraft unit. Material includes:
(1) Spare and repair parts that are shipped between
centralized repair depots and the aircraft units; and
(2) support items that are needed by aircraft unit
personnel such as food and administrative supplies.
The equation for estimating the cost of Second
Destination Transportation is :
SDT = 0.0388 X ( ACR + ACQ + RS
)
where, SDT = the annual cost of Second Destination
Transportation( FY79$k)
ACR = the annual cost of aircraft rwworks defined to
be the sum of the annual cost of airframe
rework( Element 8), Engine rework( Element 9),
and Component rework( Element rework 10)(FY79$k)
ACQ = the annual cost of aircraft operations defined
to be the Sum of the annual cost of POL
(Element 4), Maintenance material( Element 5),
and Personnel Support Supplies( Element
6)(FY79$k)
RS = the annual cost of procuring APN 6 replenishment
spares(_replenishment only) to support the
aircraft system( FY79$k)
24 . Other Support
This is the cost of all other support of the
aircraft and the squadron. It consists of a number of
different support line items funded at the system command
level which provide support to the aircraft.
Since these activities support many weapon systems,
it is advantageous to use the methodology in the Navy
Resources Model Program Factors Mannual to allocate these
costs to the various weapon systems. The allocation is made
based on a number of different proxy variables such as the
annual cost of aircraft rework, the annual cost of aircraft
operations, the annual flying hours, and the annual
Replenishment Spares cost ; or, some combination of all of
these parameters.
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The equation for estimating the cost of other
support is :
TS = 0.1952 RS + 0.02112 FHY + 0.0907 ACR + a. 0018
( ACR + ACQ + RS
)
where, TS = the annual cost of other support( FY79$k)
RS = the annual cost of replenishment spares
(Elementl5)( FY79$k)
FHY = the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year
ACR = the annual cost of aircraft reworks defined to
be the sum of the annual cost of Airframe
Rework( Element 8), Engine Reworkf Element 9),
and Component Rework( Element 10)(FY79$k)
ACQ = the annual cost of aircraft operations defined
to be the sum of the annual cost of POL
(Element 4) , Maintenance jyiaterial (Element 5),
and Personnel Support Supplies( Element 6)
( FY79&k)
25 . Personnel Acquisition
This is the cost of recruiting and examining activi-
ties necessary .to support the squadron manpower required by
the aircraft. The Navy Resources Model Program Factors
Mannual computes this cost by summing two-thirds (2/3) of
the cost of program element 81711N-Recruiting activities,
and 81713N-Recruiting activities, and allocating these costs
to the weapon systems on the basis- of the enlisted personnel
required.
The equation for estimating the cost of personnel
acquisition is:
PAG = 0. 0010 DBE
PAE = 0. 0075 DBE
PAOM = 0. 0613 DBE
PA = (PAG X GPR)(PAE x EPR) + ( PAGM)
where, PAG = the number of recruiting and examining officer
necessary to support the weapon system.
DBE = the total number of enlisted personnel, direct
(Element 1, 2 and 3) plus base operating(Element 16)requirea to operate and provide
base suppori; to the aircraft system
PAE' = the number of recruiting and examining enlisted
necessary to support the weapon system
POAM = recruiting and examining O&MN funds necessary
to support the weapon system( FY79$k)
PA = the total cost(FY79$k) of personnel acquisition
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OPR = the officer pay rate( FY79$k=24. 86)
EPR = the enlisted pay rate( FY79$k = 10.68)
26 . Personnel Training
This is the cost of paying (1) personnel in training
who will replace unit personnel, (2) the training staff and
(3) training operating funds. It includes all training from
recruit training to undergraduate pilot and navigator
training as well as the operation and maintenance of
trainers and simulators by the Fleet Aviation Specialized
Operational Training- Detatchments and the Naval Air
Maintenance Training Detatchments. This element does not
include any aspect of readiness training , which is costed
as a separate squadron.
The equation for estimating the cost of personnel
training is :
TO = 0. 0001 DBE + 0. 0075 DBT + 0. 0632 DBO
TE= 0. 1624 DBE + 0. 0649 DBT + 0. 0149 DBO
TOM = 0. 0029 DBE + 0. 2006 DBT + 0. 0461 DBO
TT = (TO X OPR) + (TE X EPR) + TOM
where, TO = the number of officer staff required for
training duties
DBE = the total number of enlisted personnel, direct
(Element 1 , 2 , and 3) plus base operating(Element lb) required to operate and provide
base support to the aircraft system.
DBO = the total number of officer personnel, direct
(Element 1 . 2 , and 3) plus base operating(Elementl6) support, required to operate and
provide base support to the aircraft system.
DBT = the total number of personnel, direct(^Element
1,2, and 3) plus base operating( Element 16)
support, required to operate and provide base
support to the aircraft system
TE = the total number of enlisted personnel required
for training duties.
TOM = training O&MN funds( FY79$k)
TT = the total annual cost of individual training
(FY79$k)
OPR = the officer pay rate( FY79$k = 24.86)
EPR = the enlisted pay rate( FY79$k = 10.68)
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27 . Transients /Holding account
This cost element can be divided into two parts;
Transients and the Personnel Holding Account. Transients is
the cost of personnel involved in a move, such as: accession
moves, separation moves, training moves, operational moves,
rotational moves, and organized unit moves. The personnel
holding account is the cost of manpower which are in a non-
available status. This account includes (1) all patients;
(2) prisoners and others confined for judicial or discipli-
nary reasons; and (3) those awaiting disposition back to
normal status, awaiting discharge, or in the process of
discharge.
The equation for estimating the cost of Transients
and Personnel Holding Accounts is :
OTHA = 0. 0611 DBO
ETHA = 0. 056 DBE
THA = (OTHA X OPR) + (ETHA x EPR)
where, OTHA = the number of officers in the officer
Transients/Holding Account category
ETHA = the number of enlisted personnel in the
enlisted Transient/Holding Account category
DBO = the total number of officer personnel < direct
(Element 1,2, and 3 ) plus base operating
( Element l6 ) required to operate and providebase support to the aircraft system
DBE = the total number of enlisted personnel < direct
(Element 1, 2, and 3) plus base operating(Element 16), required to operate and provide
base support to the aircraft system.
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IX. APPLICATION OF LCC FOR THE AIRCRAFT ACOUSITIOM IN R. 0. K.
As noted in Chapter I, R. 0. K. has acquired most of its
major weapon systems from foreign countries. Historically,
the acquisition of weapon systems within the R. 0. K. has been
made using the traditional approach of trade-offs between
system effectiveness and minimum procurement cost, with
little or no consideration being given to operating and
support costs that wi-il be encountered when the systems are
deployed in the field. Therefore, in this chapter,, major
consideration will be given to the 0<SS costs.
This chapter provides an example of LCC application for
the tactical fighter acqusition program which the Korea Air
Force may face in these days. This example illustrates a
life cycle cost analysis involving the evaluation of two
alternative aircraft. The model described in Chapter VIII
are used for this purpose.
A. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
There is a requirement to replace an existing old
tactical fighter in the Korea Air Force for the purpose of
improving operational effectiveness. The existing aircraft
that they will replace are F-4s. Suppose that the Korea Air
Force is considering two U. S. tactical fighters ( F-14A,
F-18A) as alternative aircraft. As noted in Chapter I, in
every year, about six percent of the GNP which accounted to
one- third of the national budget, was spent on defense. One
-third of the defense expenditure, was spent on equipment
maintenance.
In" the Korea's semi-war situation, operational readiness
is a very important consideration. Therefore, a decision is
needed as to type of aircraft deemed most feasible from the
standpoint of performance, reliability, and life-cycle cost.
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However, for the purposes of this study, analysis and evalu-
ation will be restricted to LCC analysis in terms of
logistic support.
B. • ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA BASES
In addition to the model-peculiar assumptions discussed
in Chapter VIII, other assumptions relevant to our applica-
tion require identification. To compare the three
aircraft's LCC, the following assumptions are needed.
1. Costs are based on FY86 data and therefore are in
real FY86 dollars.
2. The number of aircraft operated by each tactical
fighter squadron are twelve.
3. The average flying hours per month for each of the
three aircraft are 26. 5 hours.
4. Annual operating and support cost for each of three
aircraft for useful life will be incurred in same
costs.
5. The life cycle, for the purpose of this example, is 25
years. Salvage values are not considered.
6. The life cycle cost includes R. 0. K's acquisition cost
plus operating and support over the 25-year period of
use.
Most of the available cost information and aircraft
performance data has been obtained from the following
sources.
* Navy Aircraft O&S Cost-Estimating Model-FY79 Revision.
* Procurement Programs (P-1), DoD Budget for FY 1986.
* U. S. Military Aircraft Cost Hand Book.
* Defense Management Journal, Vol.20, No 1, 1984
* Janes "All the World's Aircraft"
The squadron manning is based on 1976 NARM DATA and is
shown in Table V.
The reliability and performance data for each of the



























AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE DATA
F-4J F-14A F-18A -
MTBF 0. 66 0. 71 1.31
Unsched. MMH
Per Failure
15. 5 19.2 10. 1
Unsched.
MMH/FH
24. 9 27. 1 7. 72








Table VII is a summary of the estimates for annual O&S
costs of the three aircraft calculated using Cost-Estimating
Model described in Chapter VIII. The calculation processes
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of operating and support costs are included in Appendix A,
The results were obtained from using Cost-Estimating Model
in FY79 dollars, these results then were converted to FY86
dollars by dividing the FY79 dollars by DoD deflator for the
O&S costs.
TABLE VII
ESTIMATED ANNUAL O&S COSTS PER AIRCRAFT
(Thousands, FY86 dollars)
COST ELEMENT • F-4J F-14A F-18A
Unit Mission Personnel 532. 464 563. 512 308. 405
Unit Level Consumption 627.052 621. 586 411. 236
Depot Level Consumption 394. 248 769. 219 314. 472
Sustaining Investments 156. 937 447. 636 80. 181
Installation Support
Personnel
12. 746 13. 702 9. 722
Indirect Personnel
Support
41.202 43.39i 31. 188
Depot Non-Maintenance 155. 900 244. 512 98.027
Personnel Acquisition
and Training
126. 298 135. 316 95. Ill
TOTAL 2,046. 346 2,838.875 1,348.339
The next phase for application is to compute LCC for
each of three aircraft. Before proceeding to next phase,
one major assumption is needed. This assumption is that the
R. 0. K. will purchase aircraft in program cost per unit
incurred by U. S. Navy.
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The program cost per aircraft includes average RDT&E
cost per unit plus average procurement cost per unit.
Actual purchase prices by FMS would be higher than program
cost because actual purchase prices are decided by negotia-
tion between two countries. For the purpose of analysis,
these data were obtained from Procurement Programs( P-1 ) for
FY1986 and U. S. Military Aircraft Cost Handbook. These Data
are shown in Table VIII.
TABLE -VI I
I
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM COST FOR FY86
(Millions, FY86 dollars)
F-4J F-14A F-18A
Total Program 367.9 * 838. 6 2,701.
4
Production Quantities 34 18. 84
Acquisition Cost
per Unit 10. 82 46. 590 32. 159
* Program cost for the F-4J were obtained by converting
grogram cost for the FY70 to . the FY 86 dollars by using
oD deflator for the procurement cost.
Referring to Table VIII the acquisition costs paid by
R. 0. K. for each of three aircraft are $10.82 Million for the
F-4J, $46,590 Million for the F-14A, and $32,159 Million for
the F-18A aircraft. These values are in FY86 dollars.
For purposes of this thesis, the average life of the
individual aircraft was projected to be 25 years.
When evaluating two or more alternatives on a relative
basis, the individual cost projections for each alternative
must be discounted to the present value. Therefore, a 10%
discount factor and a 5% inflation rate were assumed. Costs
for life cycle of 25 years of each alternative are included
in Appendix B.,
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D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS.
For the purpose of this study, analysis and evaluation
will be focused on the life cycle cost in terms of logistics
support. The problem is to select the best among two alter-
natives on the basis of reliability and life-cycle cost
because our analysis and evaluation are restricted to life
cycle cost analysis in terms of logistics support.
TABLE IX
LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS BREAKDOWN
(Thousands in FY86 dollars)
Cost Category
F-4J F-14A F-18A
Cost( $) % of Cost($) % of Cost( $) % of
Total Total Total






8,546 19. 6 9,023 9. 8 4,944 9. 2
Personnel
b. Unit Level 10,029 23 9,944 10. 8 6,556 12. 2
Consumption




2,485 5. 7 7,182 7. 8 1,343 2. 5
e. Installation 2,180 0. 5 184 0. 2 161 0. 3
Support
Personnel
f. Indirect 654 1. 5 644 0. 7 484 0. 9
Personnel
Support
g. Depot Non- 2,529 5.8 3,959 4. 3 1,558 2. 9
Maintenance
i. Personnel 2,006 4. 6 2,210 2. 4 1,505 2. 8
Acquisition
<Sc Training
SUB-TOTAL 32,783 75.2 45,481 49. 4 21,577 40. 1














Figure 9, 1 Alternative Cost Profiles (Discounted Costs)
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A comparison of alternatives " F-14A " and " F-18A "
using this criterion is presented in Table IX, and the cost
profiles are illustrated in Figure 9. 1. These values are
the present values in FY86 dollars.
The results of this analysis support the "F-18A" as the
preferred alternative on the basis of life cycle cost and
reliability. As shown in Table IX, acquisition cost for the
F-18A among two alternative aircraft is lower than the
F-14A's acquisition cost. The F-18A also is far less expen-
sive to operate and support than the F-14A and F-4J.
Consequently, total LCC for the F-18A aircraft is lower than
the F-14s. Operating and support costs are a significant
portion of a weapon system's total life cycle cost. As
showned in Table IX, estimates of two alternative aircraft
and one existing aircraft O&S costs as a percentage of total
life cycle cost are 49. 4 percent for the F-14A, 40. 1 percent
for the F-18A and 75.2 percent for the F-4J aircraft.
•
Operating and support costs constitute about half the total
LCC of an aircraft weapon system. Therefore, it is impor-
tant for DoD decision-makers to analyze such costs in detail
when considering the acquisition of new systems.
As discussed earlier, the F-18 is less expensive to
operate and support than the F-4s and F-14s. Table VII
showed that the F-18 to cost only half as much to operate
and support than F-14. Those costs for the F-18 also were
reduced by about one-third compared with existing aircraft,
F-4. From the LCC results, it is not clear to what extent
reliability and maintainability improvements have affected
operating and support costs as compared with the effects of
technological advances and changes in complexity and
capability. However, the LCC results of each aircraft
showed that reliability and maintainability are important
factors in determining operating and support costs.
Increased reliability and maintainability in the form of
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reduced maintenance personnel requirements and logistic
support lead to potential savings in O&S costs. The higher
the failure rates and the more equipment there is to fail,
the higher the maintenance cost for parts and personnel.
Similarly, the more difficult access is to components and
parts, the greater will be the time required to remove and
replace an item.
Referring to Table VI, reliability of the F-18 is higher
than that of the F-14 weapon system. The reliability of the
F-18 is superior to other aircraft ( F-4J, F-14A) because of
its design. The F-18 also is more maintainable than the
alternative aircraft, F-14 and the existing aircraft, F-4.
Table VI showed that a maintenance man-hours per flight hour
of 26.2 for the F-18, compared to 50.8 for the F-4 and 55.9
for the F-14. The O&S costs of each aircraft imply that
potential savings may accrue from increased reliability and
maintainability in the form of reduced maintenance personnel
requirements and logostics support. The personnel
requirements for each aircraft are shown in Figure 9,
2
The squadron manning for the F-18 was reduced by about
one-third compared with the F-14, by about one-fourth
compared with the F-4. Most of the reduction was to be in
maintenance functions. The aircrew requirements for the
F-18 are one-half those of F-14 because the F-18 is a
single-seater, whereas the F-14 and F-4 are two-seaters.
Therefore, personnel costs for the F-18 are lower than for
the F-14 and F-4 aircraft
The extensive use of non-corrosive composite materials
and fewer fastener types reduced the depot level airframe
rework cost for the F-18. In addition, engine rework cost
was substantially lower for the F-18 than for the F-14 and
the F-4 due to fewer parts and lighter weight. For example,
the F-18's engines have about 7,700 fewer parts and weigh

















Figure 9.2 SQUADRON MANNING.
Spares costs per aircraft were estimated to be lower for
the F-18 than the F-14. Navy officials attributed lower
spares costs for the F-18 as compared with the F-14 to reli-
ability and maintainability efforts. Spares costs for the
F-14 are more than double those for the F-4s. Subsystem
complexity may be of one of the causes for this increase.
However, we suspect that less system complexity accounts for
much of the difference.
These LCC results showed that reliability, maintain-
ability and complexity of weapon systems are major factors
affecting LCC, especially O&S costs over its useful life.
In conclusion, the results of this analysis support the
"F-18" as the preferred alternative on the basis of life
cycle cost. The F-18 aircraft is more reliable and easier to
maintain than the F-14. These factors of the F-18 result in
reducing significantly it's LCC, especially O&S costs.
92
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to introduce the LCC
concepts within the R. 0. K. military and present the LCC
application methodology in new weapon systems acquisition
for the R. 0. K. military.
It has been shown that life cycle costing has the poten-
tial to be an excellent management tool for controlling the
total life cycle costs of a system during the acquisition
process. Life cycle cost also can be viewed as a useful
procurement technique in which competing systems are evalu-
ated on the total cost over their useful life rather than
selection being based on initial acquisition cost.
The R. 0. K. military has concentrated on R&D and produc-
tion for weapon systems since 1976. However, the R. 0. K.
still acquires most of its sophisticated weapon systems from
foreign countries. In any case, cost estimating plays an
important role. The apparent fact is that the O&S costs are
increasing at an alarming rate and often exceed the initial
acquisition cost. The LCC results of application indicated
that O&S costs constitute about half the total LCC of an
aircraft weapon system. This requires that the life-cycle
cost estimating methodologies must be applied as a major
management tool in today's acquisition process for the
Korean military. Implementation of the concept and method-
ologies presented in this thesis implies that some change
has to be made in the procurement criteria actually in prac-
tice within the R. O. K. military in order to make operating
and support costs a real factor in source selection for
acquisition of weapon systems.
The LCC results also showed that reliability and
maintainabilty are the most important factors in determining
0<SS costs. Significant savings will be achieved through
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investments early in the program that will increase system
reliability and simplify maintenance. Reliability and
logistic supportability are design attributes, and their
improvement will markedly increase system readiness.
Therefore, reliability and maintainability must be
emphasized in new weapon systems acquisition as key
considerations.
The implementation of the life cycle cost concept and
techniques by the R. 0. K. military will i-mprove considerably
the decision making process in weapon systems acquisition
programs. At the same time, a more rational view of future
costs incurred by introduction of a new system into the
organization will result in more accurate budget estimates.
Life cycle cost is not a panacea or a substitute for
managerial decision making. It is concept which foster good
management. By managing this concept effectively, DoD
managers can reduce the upward trend of 0<ScS costs; there-
fore, making more funds available to acquire new systems to
meet the growing military threat.
The R. 0. K. military must recognize the importance of
these concepts and methodologies. Also, these concepts and
methodologies must be reflected in the acquisition strategy
and the logistics support management policy.
In order to implement the LCC analysis methodology
during the weapon system acquisition process in
R. 0. K. military it is proposed that the DoD takes the
following actions:
1. Training on LCC procurement policies and procedures
should be conducted at Service schools
2. Cost-estimating model by using computer should be
developed. In herent in the use of LCC models is the
need to have accurate historical cost data on similar
systems. This data does not exist. Therefore, DoD
should develop a system which will collect and report
06cS costs by weapon system.
3. DoD should get logisticians involved in the acquisi-
tion process, as early as concept development, and
have them establish a dialogue with the program
managers and contractor personnel to impress upon them
the importance of support costs considerations.
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A = OA + EA
OA = X CF X OPR
EA = E X CF X EPR
= 2, CF = 34/12 = 2.83, OPR = 24.86
OA = 2 X 2.83 X 24.86 = 140.708
EA = 0, A = 140.708 + = 140.708
2. Maintenance Personnel
MP = ( MO X EPR ) + ( MOO x OPR )
MO = 15.7, EPR = 10.68, OPR = 24.86
MP = ( 15. 7 X 10.68 ) + ( 2/12 x 24.86 ), = 171.819
3. Other Unit Personnel
OUP = ( 00 X OPR ) + ( OUE X EPR )
OPR = 24.86, OUE = 4.58, EPR = 10.86
OUP = ( 1/12 X 24. 86 ) + ( 4. 58 x 10. 86 ) = 50. 986
Unit mission personnel cost = 140.708 + 171.819 + 50.986
= 363. 513
UNIT LEVEL CONSUMPTION
4. Petroleum, Oil Lubricants
POL = ( PG X POLE X FHY ) / 1000
POL = ( 0. 6 X 1408 X 318 ) / 1000 = 268.646
5. Maintenance material
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MMC = ( MM X FHY ) / 1,000
MM = 339, MMHFH = 50.8 MS = 1280
MMC = ( 339 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 107.802
6. Personnel Support Supplies
PSS = ( PS X FHY ) / 1,000
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 ( + E ) + 32.0680 RD
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 ( 2 + ) + 32.0680 ( ) = 10.191
PSS = ( 10.191 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 3.240
7. Training Ordnance
Annual estimated costs of training requirements per crew
= 43. 4
Unit level consumtion = 268.646+ 107.802 + 3.240 + 43.4
= 423. 088
DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
• 8. Airframe rework
AR = ( UAR X 12 ) / I
UAR = 262. 8 I = 42
AR = ( 262.8 X 12 )/ 42 = 75.086
9. Engine rework
ERT = ( ERH X EN X FHY ) / 1,000
ERH =57.0 EN = 2 FHY = 318
ERT = ( 57 X 2 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 36.252
10. Component rework
CR = ( CRF X FHY ) / 1,000
CRF = 371. 4
CR = ( 371.4 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 118.105
11. Other depot support
ODSC = ( ODS X FHY ) / 1,000
CDS = 95
ODSC = ( 95 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 30.21
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12. Installation of modifications
MI = 0. 1 MP
MP = 95
MI = ( 0. 1 ) ( 95 ) = 9.
5
Depot level maintenance cost = 75.086 + 36.252 + 118.105
30. 21 + 9. 5 = 269. 153
SUSTAINING INVESTMENTS
13. Replenishment spares
RS = ( RSF X FHY ) / 1,000
RSF = ( 0.4876 ) UMMHFHi-i^3i x MS'-^si^
UMMHFH = 24. 9 MS = 1280
RSF = ( 0.4876 ) ( 24.9 )i-i93i ^ ( 1280 )0.35i7 - 279.688
RS = ( 279.688 x 318 ) / 1,000 = 88.941
14. Replacement support Equipment
RGSE = 0. 0025 FC
ROSE =0
15. Modifications procurement
MP = 0. 0041 FC
MP = 18. 2
Sustaining investments cost = 88. 941 + + 18. 2 =107. 141
INSTALLATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
16. Base operating support personnel
BO = 0. 0014 X TDP
BE = 0. 0169 X TDP
BOP =_( HO X OPR ) + ( BE X EPR )
BO = 0.0014 X ( 278/12 ) = ( o. 0014 )( 23. 167 ) =0.0324
BE = 0.0169 X ( 278/12 ) = 0.3915
BOP = (0.0324 X 24.86) + (0.3915 x 10.86) = 0.805
+ 4. 181 = 4. 986
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17. Health care support personnel
HO = 0. 0038 DBT
HE = 0. 0059 DBT
HCP = ( HO X OPR ) + ( HE X EPR )
DBT = ( 23.167 ) + 0.0324 + 0.3915 = 23.5909
HO = 0.0038 ( 23.5909 ) = 0.0896
HE = 0.0059 ( 23.5909 ) = 0.1392
HCP = (0.0896 X 24.86) + (0.1392 x 10.68) = 2.229
1. 4867 = 3. 716
Installation support personnel cost = 4.986+3.716 = 8.702
INDIRECT PERSONNEL SUPPORT
18. Base operating support
BOS = 0. 4568 TDP
TDP = 23. 167
BOS = 0.4568 ( 23.167 ) = 10.583
19. Health care support
HOM = 0. 1148 DBT
DBT = 23. 167
HOM = 0.1148 ( 23.167 ) = 2.660
20. Permanent change of station
PCS = 1.3680 DBO + 0.4736 DBE
DBO = 3. 0843
DBE = 20. 6227
PCS = 1.3680 ( 3.0843 ) + ( 0.4736 )( 20.6227 )= 13.986
21. Temporary additional duty
TAD = 0.
9
Indirect personnel support cost= 10. 583 + 2. 660 + 13. 986
+ 0. 9 = 28. 189
DEPOT NON-MAINTENANCE
22. General depot supply
SDO = 0. 0497 ( ACR + ACO + RS )
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ACR = 75.086 + 36.252 + 118.105 =229.443
AGO = 268.646 + 107.802 + 3.240 = 379.688
RS = 88. 941
SDO = 0.0497 ( 229.443 + 379.688 + 88.941 ) = 34.694
23. Second destination transportation
SDT = 0. 0388 X ( ACR + ACQ + RS )
SDT = 0.0388 X ( 229.443 + 379.688 + 88.941 ) = 23.595
24. Other support
TS = 0.1952 RS + 0.02112 FHY + 0.0907 ACR + 0.0018(ACR
+ ACQ + RS).= (0. 1952)(88. 941) + ( 0. 02112 )( 318
)
+ (0. 0907)(229. 443)+0. 0018(229. 443 + 379. 688+88. 941)
= 17.361 + 6.716 + 20.810 + 1.257 = 46.144
Depot non-maintenance cost = 36. 694 + 23. 595 + 46. 144
= 106. 433
PERSONNEL ACQUISITION AND TRAINING
25. Personnel acquisition
PAG = 0. 0010 DBE
PAE = 0. 0075 DBE
POAM = 0. 0613 DBE
PA = ( PAG X GPR ) ( PAE x EPR ) + ( POAM )
PAG = 0. 0010 ( 20. 623 ) = 0. 02062
PAE = 0.0075 ( 20.623 ) = 0.15467
PAOM = 0.0613 ( 20.623 ) = 1.2642
PA = ( 0.02062 X 24.86 ) ( 0.15467 x 10.68 ) + 1.2642
= 2. 125
26. Personnel training
TO = 0. 0001 DBE + 0. 0075 DBT + 0. 0632 DBG
TE = 0. 16-24 DBE + 0. 0649 DBT + 0. 0149 DBG
TGM =~0. 0029 DBE + 0. 2006 DBT + 0. 0461 DBG
TT = ( TO X GPR ) + ( TE X EPR ) + TGM
TG = 0. 0001(20. 623) + (0. 0075)(23. 707)
0. 0632(3. 084 ) = 0. 3748
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TE = 0. 1624 '(20. 623) + 0.0649 (23.707)
+ 0. 0149 (3. 084) = 4. 934
TOM = 0.0029 (20.623) + 0.2006 (23.707) + 0.0461
(3. 084) = 4. 9576
TT = (0. 3748)(24. 86) + (4.934 x 10.68) + 4.9576
= 66. 97
27. Transients / Holding account
OTHA = 0. 0611 DBG
ETHA = 0. 0565 DBE
THA = ( OTHA X OPR ) + ( ETHA x EPR )
OTHA = 0.0611 ( 3.084 )= 0.1884
ETHA = 0.0565 ( 20.623 ) = 1.1652
THA = ( 0.1884 X 24. 86 ) + ( 1.1652 x 10.68 ) = 17.128






A = OA + EA
OA = X CF X OPR
EA = E X CF X EPR
= 2 CF = 34/12 = 2.83 OPR = 24.86
OA = 2 X 2.83 X 24.86 = 140.708
EA =
A = 140. 708 + = 140. 708
2. Maintenance Personnel
MP = (MO X EPR) + (MOO x OPR)
MO = 205/12 = 17. 1
MOO = 5/12 = 0. 42
EPR = 10. 68 OPR = 24. 86
MP = ( 17. 1 X 10.68) + (0.42 x 24.86)
= (182.628) + (10.441) = 193.069
3. Other unit personnel
OUP = (00 X OPR) + (OUE X EPR)
OUP = (1/12 X 24.86) + (54/12 x 10.86)
= 2. 063 + 48. 87
= 50. 933
Unit mission personnel cost = 140.708 + 193.069 + 50.933
= 384. 71
UNIT LEVEL CONSUMPTION
4. Petrolimn, oil lubricants




MMC = (MM X FHY)/1000
MM = 401 FHY =318
MMC = (401 X 318)/1000 = 127.518
6. Personnel support supplies
PSS = (PS X FHY)/1000
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 (0 + E) + 32.0680 RD
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 (2 + 0)+32. 0680( 0) = 10.191
PSS = (10.191 X 318)/1000 = 3.241
7. Training ordnance
Annual estimated costs of training requirements per crew
= 50. 9




8. Air frame rework
AR =(UAR X 12) /I
UAR = 493. 8 I = 30
AR = (493.8 X 12)/30 = 197.52
9. Engine rework
ERT = 125.9 EN = 2 FHY = 318
ERT = (125.9 X 2 X 318)/1000 = 80.072
10. Component rework
CR = (CRF X FHY)/1000 = (630.6 x 318)/1000 = 200.531
11. Other depot support
ODSC = (QDS X FHY)/1000
CDS =~100. 7
ODSC = (100.7 X 318)/1000 = 32.023
12. Installation of modificationsa
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MI = 0. 1 MP
MP = 150
MI = (0. 1)( 150) = 15
Depot level maintenance cost = 197.52 + 80.072 + 200.531
+ 32. 023 + 15 = 525. 146
SUSTAINING INVESTMENTS
13. Replenishment spares
RS = (RSF X FHY)/1000
RSF = 495. 6
RS = (495.6 X 318)/1000 = 157.601
14. Replacement support equipment
RGSE = 0. 0025 FC
RGSE =
15. Modifications procurement
MP = 0, 0041 FC
MP = 148 (VAMOSC 3yr avg)
Sustaining investments cost = 157. 601 + + 148
= 305. 601
INSTALLATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
16. Base operating support personnel
BO = 0. 0041 X TDP
BE = 0. 0169 X TDP
BOP = (BO X OPR) + (BE X EPR)
BO = 0.0014 X (299/12) = 0.0014 x 24.917 = 0.0349
BE = 0.0169 X (299/12) =0.4211
BOP = (0.0349 X 24.86) + (0.4211 x 10.86)
= 0. a68+ 4. 497 = 5. 365
17. Health care support personnel
HO = 0. 0038 DBT
HE = 0. 0059 DBT
HOP = (HO X OPR) '+ (HE X EPR)
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DBT = 24.917 +0.0349 +0.4211 = 25.373
HO = 0.0038(25.373) = 0.096
HE =0. 150
HCP = (0.096 X 24.86) + (0.15 x 10.68)
=2. 387 +1. 602 = 3. 989
Installation support personnel cost
= 5. 365 + 3. 989 = 9. 354
INDIRECT PERSONNEL SUPPORT
18. Base operating support -
BOS = 0. 4568 TDP'
TDP = 24. 917
BOS = 0.4568 (24.917) = 11.382
19. Health case support
HOM = 0. 1148 DBT
DBT = 25. 373
HOM = 0.1148(25.373) = 2.913
20. Permanent change of station
PCS = 1.3680 DBO + 0.4736 DBE
DBO = 3. 3679
DBE = 22. 0041
PCS = 1.3680(3.3679) + ( 0. 4736) ( 22. 0041
)
= 4. 607 +10. 421 = 15. 028
21. Temporary additional duty
TAD = 0.
3
Indirect personnel support cost
= 11.382 + 2.913 + 15.028 + 0. 3 = 29.623
DEPOT NON-MAI-NTENANCE
22. General depot support
SDO = 0.0497 (ACR + ACO + RS)
ACR = 197.52 + 80.072 + 200.531 = 478.123
ACO = 242.698 +127. 518 + 3.241 = 373.457
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RS = 157. 601
SDO = 0.0497 (478.123 + 373.457 + 157.601)
= 50. 156
23. Second destination transportation
SDT = 0.0338 X ( ACR + ACQ + RS
)
SDT = 0.0338 X (478.123 + 373.457 + 157.601)
= 34. 110
24. Other support
TS = 0.1952 RS + 0.02112 FHY + 0.0907 ACR + 0.0018
(ACR + ACQ + RS)
= 0.1952(157.601) + 0.02112(318) + 0.0907(478.123)
+0.0018 (478.123 + 373.457 + 157.601)
= 30.764 + 6.716 + 43.366 + 1.817
= 82. 663
Depot non-maintenance cost
= 50.156+ 34.110 + 82.663
= 166. 929
PERSONNEL ACQUISITION AND TRAINING
25. Personnel acquisition
PAO = 0. 0010 DBE
PAE = 0. 0075 DBE
PAOM = 0. 0613 DBE
PA = (PAO X 0PR)(PAE X EPR) + (PAOM)
PAO = 0.0010 (22.0041) = 0.022
PAE = 0.0075(22.0041) = 0.165
PAOM = 0.0613(22.0041) = 1.349
PA = (0.022 X 24. 86)( 0.165 x 10.68) + (1.349)
=(0. 5469)( 1. 7622) + 1.349 = 2.313
26. Personnel training
TO = 0. 0001 DBE + 0. 0075 DBT + 0. 0632 DBO
TE = 0. 1624 DBE + 0. 0649 DBT + 0. 0149 DBO
TOM = 0. 0029 DBE + 0. 2006 DBT + 0. 0461 DBO
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TT = (TO X OPR) + (TE X EPR) + TOM
TO = 0.0001(22.0041) + 0.0075(25.373) + 0.0632(3.3679)
=0.0022 + 0.1903 + 0.2169
=0. 4054
TE = (0. 1624)(22. 0041)+0. 0649(25. 373)+0. 0149(3. 3679)
=3.5734 + 1.6467 + 0.0562
=5.2703
TOM = 0.0029(22.0041) + 0. 2006( 25. 373 )+0. 00461( 3. 3679
)
=0. 0638 + 5. 09 + 0. 1553
= 5. 309
TT = (0. 4054)(24. 86) + ( 5. 2703 )( 10. 68) + 5.309
= 10. 078 + 56. 287 + 5. 309
= 71. 674
27. Transients/Holding account
OTHA = 0. 0611 DBG
ETHA = 0. 0565 DBE
THA = (OTHA X OPR) + (ETHA x EPR)
OTHA = 0.0611 (3.3679) = 0.2058
ETHA = 0.0565(22.0041) = 1.2432
THA = (0.2058 x 24.86) + (1.2432 x 10.68)
= 5. 116 + 13. 277 = 18. 393
Personnel acquisition and training





A = OA + EA
OA = X CF X OPR
EA = E X CF X EPR
0=1 CF = 19/12 = 1.58 OPR = 24.86
OA = 1 X 1. 58 X 24.86= 39.279
A = 39. 279 + = 39. 279
2~ Maintenance personnel
MP ={ MO X EPR ) + ( MOO x OPR )
MO = 16.9620 + 0.0083 MMHMO - 0.9356 NA
MMHMO = MMH / FH x FH / MO = 26. 2 x 26. 5 = 694. 3
NA = 12
MO = 16.9620 + 0.0083 ( 694.3 ) - ( 0.9356 ) ( 12 ) =
16.9620 + 5.7627 - 11.2272 = 129.008
3. Other unit personnel
OUP = ( 00 X OPR ) + ( OUE X EPR )
OUE = ( 2.7482 OSM°-5''8 3 j / 12
OSM = ( (- 0+E ) X CF + MO + MOO ) x NA
OSM =~( ( 1 + ) X 1.58 + 11.4975 + 3/12 ) x 12 = 159.93
OUE = ( 2.7482 ( 159.93 )''-54 8 3 ^ / ^2 = 3.7007
OUP = ( 1/12 X 24. 86 ) + ( 3.7007 x 10.86 ) = 42.261




4. Petroleum, oil lubricants
POL = ( PG X POLE X FHY ) / 1,000
POLE = 1.0253 MS°-^35° Qrj^Qy^o.ss 26 pQ-0,4973
MS = 1006 GTOW =33.6 PD =
POLE = 1.0253 ( 1006)°-S35'' ( 33. 6) "^^ « ^6 ( q) -o.4 9 7 3
= (82.6991) (10.301) = 851.882
POL = ( ( 0. 6 ) X (851.882) x 318 )/ 1,000 = 162.539
5. Maintenance material
MMC = ( MM X EHY ) / 1,000
MM = 2.6108 MMHEH^-^STS ^ MS'-^'^^
MMHEH = 26.2 MS = 1006
MM = ( 2.6108 ) ( 26.2 )''-8 5 76 X ( 1006 ) ".i ^ a 1 = 169
MMC = ( 169 X 415 ) / 1,000 = 70.135
6. Personnel support supplies
PSS = ( PS X EHY ) / 1,000
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 ( 0+E ) + 32.0680 RD
PS = 9.1549 + 0.5182 ( 1 + ) + 32.0680 (0) = 9.6731
PSS = (9.6731 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 3.076
7. Training ordnance
Annual estimated costs of training requirements per crew
= 45




AR = ( UAR X 12 ) / I
UAR = 0.811 MMHFH''-S^34 ^ MS "-2 64 6 ^ EW"-'' « ^ "
MMHEH = 26.2 MS = 1006 EW = 22.8
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UAR = 0.811 ( 26.2 )0.6^3'> x ( 1006) "-^ s-* 6 ^ ( 22.8 ) o.-* « i "
= (7.8077) (6.2299) (4.2268) = 205.595
AR = ( ( 205. 595 ) ( 12 ) ) / 42 = 58. 741
9. Engine rework
ERT = ( ERH X EN X FHY ) / 1,000
ERH = 1.2791 THi'''5 77 ^ pD^.sozz ^ j^g^ 0.3549
TH = 16 FD = 1 MED =.1 EN = 2
ERH = ( 1. 2791)( 16)i.'»577 ^ (i)0.5022 ^ (^j 0.3549 = 72.803
ERT = ( 72.803 x 2 x 318 ) / 1,000 = 46.303
10. Component rework
CR = (CRF X FHY ) / 1,000
CRF = 3.4909 MMHFH°'''3'' "^ x EW-s a 1 7
MMHFH = 26. 2 EW = 22. 8
CRF = 3.4909 ( 26.2 ) 0.734 7 ^ ( 22.8 )'>-58i7
= (38.456 ) ( 6.1647 ) = 237.069
.CR = ( 237.069 x 318 ) / 1,000 = 75.389
11. Other depot support
ODSC = ( CDS X FHY ) / 1,000
CDS = -2.4770 + 0.0452 MS +0.0341 AEC
AEC = ( CR + ERT + AR ) / FHY
AEC = ( 75.389 + 46.303 + 58.741 ) / 318 = 0.567 = $567
CDS = -2.4770 + 0.0452 ( 1032 ) + 0.0341(567) = 60.56
ODSC = ( 60.56 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 19.257
12. Installation of modification
MI = 0. 1 MP
MP = 150
MI = ( 0. 1 ) ( 150 ) = 15
Depot lev^l maintenance cost= 58. 741 + 46. 303 + 75. 389




RS = (RSF X FHY)/ 1,000
RSF = 0.4876 UMMHFH^-i^^i ^ MS^'^si?
UMMHFH = 7. 72 MS = 1032
RSF = 0.4876 ( 7.72 ) I'l ' 3 ^ x ( 1032 )''-35i7 = 93.52
RS = ( 93.52 X 318 ) / 1,000 = 29.739
14. Replacement support equipment
RGSE = 0. 0025 FC
RGSE =
15. Modifications 'procurement
MP = 0. 0041 FC
MP = 25
Sustaining investments = 29. 739 +0 +25 = 54. 739
INSTALLATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
16. Base operating support personnel
BO = 0. 0014 X TDP
BE = 0. 0169 X TDP
BOP = ( BO X OPR ) + ( BE X EPR )
BO = 0.0014 X (212/12 ) = (0.0014) ( 17.667) = 0.2986
BOP = (0.0247 X 24. 86 ) + ( 0.2986 x 10.68 )
= 0. 614 + 3. 189 = 3. 803
17. Health care support personnel
HO = 0. 0038 DBT
HE = 0. 0059 DBT
HCP = ( HO X OPR ) + ( HE X EPR )
DBT = (17.667) + (0.0247) + (0.2986) = 17.9903
HO = 0.0038 ( 17.9903 ) = 0.1061
HCP = ( 0. 0684 X 24. 86 ) + ( 0. 1061 x 10. 86 )
= 1. 7004 + 1. 1331 = 2. 834




18. Base operating support
BOS = 0. 4568 TDP
TDP = 212/12 = 17. 667
BOS = 0.4568 ( 17.667 ) = 8.070
19. Health care support
HOM = 0. 1148 DBT
DBT = 17.667 + 0.0247 + 0.2986 = 17.9903
HOM = 0.1148 ( 17.9903 ) = 2.065
20. Permanent change of station
PCS = 1.3680 DBO + 0.4736 DBE
DBO = 23/12 + 0.0247 = 1.9167 + 0.0247 =1.9414
DBE = 189/12 + 0.2986 = 15.75 + 0.2986 = 16.0486
PCS = 1.3680 ( 1.9414 ) + 0.4736 ( 16.0486 )
= 2. 656 +. 7. 601 = 10.257
21. Temporary additional duty
TAD = 0.9
Indirect personnel support cost = 8.070 + 2.065 + 10.257
+ 0. 9 = 21.292
DEPOT NON-MAINTENANCE
22. General depot supply
SDO = 0. 0497 ( ACR + ACO + RS )
ACR = 58. 741 + 46. 303 + 75. 389 = 180. 433
ACO = 162.539 + 70.135 + 3.076 = 235.75
RS = 29. 739
SDO =-0.0487 ( 180.433 + 235.75 + 29.739 ) = 22.162
23. Second destination trasportation
SDT = 0. 0388 X ( ACR + ACO + RS )
= 0.0388 X ( 180.433 + 235.75 + 29.739 )= 15.072
24. Other support
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TS = 0.1952 RS + 0.02112 FHY + 0.0907 ACR + 0.0018
( ACR + ACQ + RS )
TS = 0.1952 (29.739) + 0.02112(318) + 0.0907(180.433)
+ 0. 0018( 180. 433 + 235. 75 + 29. 739)=5. 805 + 6. 716+16. 365
+ 0. 803 = 29. 689
Depot non-maintenance cost = 22. 162 + 15. 072 + 29. 689
= 66. 923
25. Personnel acqusition
PAG = 0. 0010 DBE
PAE = 0. 0075 DBE
•
PAOM = 0. 0613 DBE
PA = ( PAG X GPR ) (PAE x EPR) + (PAOM)
PAG = 0.0010 ( 189/12 + 0.2986)
= 0.0010(15.75 + 0.2986)= 0.0010(16.0486) = 0.016
PAE = 0.0075 ( 16.0486 ) = 0.12036
PAGM = 0.0613 ( 16.0486 ) = 0.98378
PA = (0.016 X 24. 86)(0. 12036 x 10.68) + 0.98378
= (0. 39776)( 1. 2854)+0. 98378 =0.5113 +0.9838 = 1.495
26. Personnel training
TO = 0. 0001 DBE + 0. 0075 DBT + 0. 0632 DBG
TE = 0. 1624 DBE + 0. 0649 DBT + 0. 0149 DBG
TGM = 0. 0029 DBE + 0. 2006 DBT + 0. 0461 DBG
TT = ( TO X GPR ) + ( TE X EPR ) + TGM
TG = 0.0001(16.0486) + 0.0075(17.9903) + 0.0632
(1.9414) = 0.0016 + 0.1349 + 0.1227 = 0.2592
TE = 0.1624(16.0486) + 0.0075 (17.9903) + 0.0149
(1.9414) = 2.6063 + 1.1678 + 0.0289 = 3.803
TOM = 0.0029(16.0486) + 0.2006(17.9903) + 0.0461
(1.-9414) = 0.0465 + 3.6089 + 0.0895 = 3.7449
TT = (0.2592 X 24.86) + (3.803 x 10.86) + 3.7449
= 6.444 + 40.616 + 3.7449 = 50.805
27. Transients/Holding account
GTHA = 0. 0611 DBG
112
ETHA = 0. 0565 DBE
THA = ( OTHA X OPR ) + ( ETHA x EPR )
OTHA = 0.0611 ( 1.944 ) = 0.1186
ETHA = 0.0565 ( 16.0486 ) = 0.9067
THA = ( 0.1186 X 24.86) + ( 0.9067 x 10.68 )
= 2. 948 + 9. 684 = 12. 632
Personnel acquisition and training = 1. 495 + 50. 805
+ 12. 632 = 64. 932





3. Other unit personnel
UNIT LEVEL CONSUMPTION
4. Petroleum, oil lubricants
5. Maintenance material
















































16. Base operating support
personnel






18. Base operating support 10. 583
19. Health care support 2. 660
20. Permanent change of station 13.986
21. Temporary additional duty 0. 900
DEPOT NON-MAINTENANCE





























































4. Petroleum, oil lubricants 242. 698
5. Maintenance material 127. 518
6. Personnel support supplies 3.241



























525. 146 ( 769. 219)
157. 601 (230. 850)
( )
148. 000 (216. 786)
305. 601 (447. 636)
INSTALLATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
16. Base operating support
personnel






18. Base operating support 11. 382
19. Health care support 2. 913
20. Permanent change of station 15. 028
21. Temporary additional duty 0. 300
DEPOT NON-MAINTENANCE





























27. Transients/Holding account 18. 393 ( 26.942)
TOTAL






3. Other unit personnel
UNIT LEVEL CONSUMPTION
4. Petroleum, oil lubricants
5. Maintenance material














































29. 739 ( 43.561)
15. Modifications procurement 25. 000
54. 739
INSTALLATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL
16. Base operating support
personnel 3. 803
17. Health care support personnel 2. 834
6. 637
INDIRECT PERSONNEL SUPPORT
18. Base operating support
19. Health care support
20. Permanent change of
station
21. Temporary additional duty
DEPOT NON-MAINTENANCE




PERSONNEL ACOUISITION MD. TRAINING
25. Personnel acquisition 1. 495
26. Personnel training 50. 805




0. 900 (: 1.318)
21.292 ([ 31.188)
22. 162 [ 32.462)
15.072 [ 22.077)














PRESENT VALUE COMPARISON FOR AIRCRAFT LCC







ACQUISITION O&S INF. 6% ACQUISITION O&S
10,820 1.0000 10,820
1 2,046 2 169 0. 909-1 1,972
2 II 2 ,299 0.8265 1,905
3 2 ,437 0. 7531 1,835
4 2 ,583 0. 6830 1,764
5 2 ,738 0. 6209 1,700
6 2 ,902 0.5645 1,638
7 3 ,077 0.5132 1,579
8 3 ,261 0.4665 1,521
9 3 ,4b 7 0.4241 1,466
10 II 3 ,664 0. 3856 1,413




13 II 4 ,364 0.2897 1,254
14 4 ,62b 0.2633 1,218
15 4 ,904 0.2394 1,174
16 b ,198 0.2176 1,131
17 S ,blO 0. 1979 1,090
18 S ,841 0. 1789 1,051
19 6 ,191 0. 1635 1,012
20 b , bb3 0. 1487 976
21
—
b 9bb 0. 1351 940
22 II 7 373 0. 1229 906
23 II 7 ,81b 0. 1117 873
24 8 28b 0. 1051 871
25 'S 8 782 0.0923 811
TOTAI. 10,820 .Lis ,997 32,783
120
F-14A







ACQUISITION O&S INF. 6% ACQUISITION o&s
46,590 1.0000 46,590
1 2,839 3,009 0. 9091 2,735
2 3,190 0.8265 2,637
3 3,381 0. 7513 2,540
4 3,584 0. 6830 2,448
5 3,S00 0. 6209 2,359
6 4,028 0.5645 - 2,274
7 4,270 0.5132 2,191
S 4,526 0.4665 2,111
9 4,798 0.4241 2,035
10 5,085 0.3856 1,961
11 5,390 0.3505 1,889
12 5,714 0.3186 1,820
13 6,057 0.2897 1,755
14 6,420 0.2533 1,690
15 6,806 0.2394 1,629
16 7,214 0.2176 1,570
17 7,647 0. 1979 1,513
18 8,106 0. 1799 1,458
19 8,592 0. 1635 1,405
20 9,108 0. 1487 1,354
21 9,654 0. 1351 1,304
22 — 10,233 0. 1229 1,258
23 10,847 0. 1117 1,212
24 11,498 0. 1051 1,208
25 12,188 0. 0923 1,125
TUTXL 46,590 [65,145 45,481
121
F-18A
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